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How Many Concepts of Intentionality?

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Abstract:
The current discussion of the intentionality nature has become more sophisticated and complex. In this paper I will delineate a number of approaches to intentionality in contemporary philosophy: 1 mentalistic; 2 semantic / linguistic; 3 pragmatic; 4 somatic; 5 and naturalistic. Although philosophers identify and analyse many concepts of intentionality, from the author point of view, there is only one intentionality: mentalistic intentionality (conscious mental states are intentional). Furthermore, there are the pre-intentionality in the physical world and the meta-intentionality (or the derived intentionality) in the world of culture.
Keywords: intentionality, mentalistic intentionality, linguistic intentionality, pragmatic intentionality, somatic intentionality, naturalistic intentionality

Contemporary problems of intentionality originated in Brentano's psychological and philosophical reflections, but the idea of intentionality is older. Some relevant intuitions were developed by some philosophers in Ancient and Middle Ages (A. Kenny, D. Perler, R. Sorabji). Intentionality usually refers to mental phenomena (perceptions, thoughts, beliefs, desires, judgments etc.) being directed toward something. It plays a crucial role in phenomenological tradition (E. Husserl, M. Scheler, R. Ingarden, M. Heidegger, M. Merleau-Ponty), but – and it must be emphasized – it is understood in very different ways by various phenomenologists. Furthermore, it is one of the most important issues of analytic philosophy, and particularly in analytically oriented theories of the mind and language (G. Frege, B. Russell, R. Chisholm, J.R. Searle, H. Putnam, S. Kripke, R.C. Stalnaker). In the latter, intentionality plays an important role in this part of pragmatic theory of language which is the reason why the author of this paper will at a certain point turns his attention towards pragmatics (L. Wittgenstein, R.B. Brandom).

The issue of intentionality generates many questions: What is the real nature of intentionality? What kind of relation is it (if it is a relation): internal, conceptual or a priori? What is the mental content and what is it's character? What is the intentional object? What are the kinds of it? How and in what degree do intentional objects (of perception, imagination, memory, hope, expectations etc.) determine intentional acts? What is the object of reference of such a phenomena like fear or melancholy? Is the phenomenal consciousness intentional? How the intentionality is expressed in language and actions? Can intentionality be naturalized? Are physical brain events intentional?

The question, 'What is intentionality?', meets a number of various answers in contemporary philosophy. In the present paper I will discuss the five basic concepts of intentionality: 1 mentalistic; 2 semantic / linguistic; 3 pragmatic; 4 somatic; 5 and naturalistic[1].

1. Probably the well-known and the least controversial is the mentalistic approach to

intentionality. However there are several types of it. One can distinguish at least two basic variants: weak (general) and strong (intentionality as representation). Both assume that the intentionality of mental states is the proper one, or it is primary in relation to, e.g., the intentionality of language, and that is derivative.

(A) *The intentionality is a property of mental states (perceptions, thoughts, memoirs, imaginations, emotions) that makes them to be directed to an object.*

Usually F. Brentano is considered the father of the concept and the term 'intentionality'. At the starting point of his psychology he distinguished physical and psychic phenomena. Next he divided the psychic into three classes: presentations, judgments and emotions. The intentionality characterizes all of them:

> Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.
> This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves [4, pp. 88–89].

This passage is not clear and created lots of problems with interpretation. First, it was difficult to answer what the object of intentional reference was to be – something immanent or transcendent in relation to the subject. Usually researchers find three important theses hidden in this passage: (1) it is constitutive of the phenomenon of intentionality, as it is exhibited by mental states such as perceiving, believing, judging, desiring, hoping, loving, hating, and many others, that these mental states are directed towards something; (2) it is characteristic of the objects towards which the mind is directed by virtue of intentionality that they have the property which Brentano called intentional inexistence; (3) intentionality is the mark of the mental: all and only mental states exhibit intentionality (intentionalism)[2].

K. Twardowski appeared to be much more precise about the object of reference. He noticed an essential ambiguity of expressions 'presentation' and 'the presented'. When you had used the term 'presentation' you could have meant the act and its content as well, and as the presented you could have meant the content and the object. Therefore he distinguished precisely the act, the content and the object of presentation. He claimed that it is not enough to distinguish the act from the object, but also it is necessary to underline the difference between the content and the object: the content of a presentation (the immanent object of consciousness) and its object are two different things; see [60].

J. Searle's representationalist approach to intentionality:

(B) *The intentionality is a property of mental states (they can be in one of three psychological modes: perception, belief and desire) that relies on directing to an aspect of reality; the pointing is possible by the representational content expressed in a subordinate clause (e.g. X can see that the pen is lying on the table).*

First of all, "Intentional states represent objects and states of affairs in the same sense of 'represent' that speech acts represent states of affairs" [51, p. 4].

Intentional mental states comprises of the intentional content (propositional attitudes – propositional contents) and the psychological mode. An intentional state always refers to things by its content. It is the content that represents an object or a state of affairs. The intentional content always appears in a psychological mode. The latter is the character or the type of our intentional mindset: supposition, angst, expectation, wish etc. For example, I can express my belief concerning the rain with the statement that it is raining. And also I can express my angst or my supposition that it will be raining, or my wish that it is raining at last. In all of these cases I present not only the content of my mental state but also the character of the mindset.

According to Searle, another general feature of intentional states is that they are characterized by directions of fit. A detailed intentional state is realized in a detailed way and is featured by special conditions. They may be truth conditions – for perceptions and beliefs, conditions of fulfillment – for desires and hopes, and conditions of realization – for intents and decisions. Searle highlights also that an intentional state is the sincerity condition of a given type of speech acts. If I make the statement that *p*, I express a belief that *p*. I can't say, 'It's snowing but I don't believe it's snowing'.

> The performance of the speech act is *eo ipso* an expression or the corresponding
> Intentional state; and, consequently, it is logically odd, though not self-contradictory,
> to perform the speech act and deny the presence of the corresponding Intentional
> state [49, p. 9].

The key issue is that „every Intentional state consists of a representative content in a certain psychological mode" [51, p. 11].

The kind of intentionality that is now discussed is the primary (internal) intentionality of mind. Searle claims that there is also the intentionality of language, words, sentences (and also of pictures, symbols, diagrams or charts), and that is the secondary one, 'derived intentionality'. It exists thanks to the internal intentionality. Such words like 'Clinton', 'Washington', 'the Earth' refer to and designate respectively: the president of the U.S.A., a town in the United States and one of planets merely because intentionally we use them in these senses. Words or other conventional signs written accidentally do not mean anything themselves. They obtain the meaning by our internal intentionality of mind. Searle distinguishes these two kinds of intentionality from 'as-if intentionality', „which do not literally ascribe any intentionality at all, even though the point of the metaphorical ascription might depend on some intrinsic intentionality of human agents" [52, p. 5]. He also recognizes the collective intentionality. It is the form of intentionality that is expressed as 'we intend', 'we hope', 'we are afraid' etc., and it is not reducible to the primary intentionality.

2. Next to the mentalistic explanation of intentionality there is the linguistic one. Its exponents claim that it is necessary to take into account the semantic aspect or (the stronger version) that the speech and language are primarily intentional.

> *The intentionality is a semantic property of language. It relies on that expressions*
> *(names) mean something, and sentences possess the logical value (true or false).*

Main representatives are: G. Frege and B. Russell. Frege asked: how can one rationally hold *two* distinct singular beliefs (or names: 'the morning star', 'the evening star') that are both about one and the same object? The solution is distinction between the *reference* (or *Bedeutung*) and the *sense* (or *Sinn*) of an English individual name. The sense, which is the mode of presentation of the

reference, is presumably something abstract that can be both instantiated by a concrete individual and present to, or grasped by, a mind; whereas a proposition (a sentence) expresses a thought (a sense) but it denotes a logical value (the truth or false); see [24].

Russell criticized Frege's distinction. Actually he noticed that it explained why sometimes it is worth to predicate identity, but besides it introduced unnecessary confusion. In the theory of denotation there was no place for meaning; see [47]. Afterward Russell presented his theory of descriptions. They may be of two kinds: definite and indefinite. The former include expressions with the determiner 'the' like: 'the', 'the so and so', 'the such and such', e.g. 'the author of Waverley'. The definite description should be understood with application of unitary quantifier: 'there is exactly one'. Indefinite (polysemous) descriptions include expressions like: 'a thing', e.g. 'a man'. They may refer 1. to more than one object or 2. to nothing.

Rudolf Carnap was not so inspired by Frege's idea, but he formulated his own semantic theory. The basis of it was the difference between extension and intension. The distinction refers to constative sentences, individual expressions and predicators. The extension of a sentence is always one of the logical values, and its intension is the proposition expressed by it. The extension of an expression is an object, and its intension is a concept. The intension of a predicator 'P' is by Carnap understood as a property (feature, quality) P, and its extension is a given class; see [9].

The semantic intentionality may have a different form when it is founded on a different semantic theory, and there are many of approaches to choose: Husserl's phenomenological semantics (the sense as an ideal object), S. Kripke [32] and H. Putnam's causal semantics [44], R. Carnap's verificationist theory of meaning [8], K. Ajdukiewicz's directival theory of meaning [1], A. Tarski's theory of truth [59] or D. Davidson's truth-condition theory of meaning [16]. It is worth to indicate two tendencies here (they are closely bound together by the way): the ambition to have done with mentalism and putting the language at the main place (the primacy of language). First let us focus on the latter.

Some philosophers go further and find speech and language primarily intentional. They take it as the model of thinking and of the conceptuality of the mind. One of them was W. Sellars[3]. According to him, we gain various concepts, the concept of a thought as well, by educated and controlled language acts. An unexpressed simple thought is merely a disposition to thinking aloud ('a thinking-out-loud'). Proper thoughts come into prominence during explicit language behaviors, i.e. utterances aloud. The basic sense of thinking that P is thinking out loud that P, and it is a spontaneous and honest saying that P (verbal behaviorism). It means that thoughts and consciousness possess their intentionality thanks to semantic properties of speech and language.

There is a widely spread idea in philosophy that language is a system of conventional signs and its basic purpose is the expression and communication of thoughts. It means that primarily words mean nothing, and they are derivatives of thoughts. For example Kripke-Putnam's semantics is an attempt to make linguistic meanings independent from the intentionality of thoughts. Putnam puts it directly: "Meaning just ain't in the head" [44, p. 227). The meaning depends on the external surroundings (the physical environment) and the expert knowledge concerning it. Kripke underlines the act of baptizing and the meaning-creating role of language community. He claims that proper names make reference in a rigid way: they refer to the same objects in all possible worlds [32].

3. The above approach is closely connected with the next which is the pragmatic one:

The intentionality is a property of various kinds of practices: the primarily intentional is activity.

Such an approach is presented in pragmatism of W. James and J. Dewey. In a general and radical interpretation it is opposite to Descartes, and it preaches the primacy of action. The human ability to conceptualize and reason, use language, attribute truth, create theories and philosophy

stems only from activity. Other protagonists of such conception are M. Heidegger and pre-eminently L. Wittgenstein and R.B. Brandom.

We can say, Heidegger formulated his theory of intentionality in opposition to Husserl's phenomenology. He found the intentionality of consciousness secondary in reference to the primary intentionality, and the latter was related to the transcendence of being-in-the-world. The human was thrown into the world and permanently was coming out of himself, activity was one of the ways. First he acted and only afterwards he thought and knew, used language, created tools and culture. Nevertheless one can have doubts if Heidegger really meant that. The basic sense of the essential thinking was to discover the ontological difference between being (*Sein*) and existence (*Dasein*). His analyses concerned the level that is deeper than activity of existence [26]. As Dreyfus noticed, Heidegger did not put practice at the first place but he wanted to demonstrate that neither the activity nor thinking should be understood as a relation between a self-sufficient subject and an independent object, but it should be done in a more fontal way [21].

According to late Wittgenstein one can look at human existence from various points of view, each of them is connected with a language game. The activity is a common property of these games. Wittgenstein bound strictly the meaning of expressions of a language with the role they play in communicational practice. He treated sentential utterances as tools of communication, and underlined that language expressions and actions are as closely tied together that it is not possible to understand the meaning of expressions outside of the context of their use.

Brandom claims were similar. In his opinion, in the way of analyzing various practices one can derive language practices and semantical relations – the analysis of activity exposes the involvement in discourse practices that unveils how things are hooked up to the world. As he states, everything started from American pragmatists. They proposed to resign from the reflection over the object and the representation and begin from the nature of activity and processes that constitute the relation.

One can reconstruct Brandom's conception with the following statements:

(1) The main idea of pragmatism holds that the basic kind of intentionality (which is usually understood as direction to an object) is a practical engagement in interactions with objects. They are typical for thinking beings that get involved in relations with the world.

(2) The rudimentary form of activity of this kind is the cycle Test-Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE). It includes perception, action and the evaluation of results of the last and the next actions. This kind of practice consists of an indefinite number of actions that are controlled by a feedback.

(3) Practices controlled by a feedback are 'thick'. It means that essentially they embrace objects, events or states of affairs in the world. The opposite are 'thin' reactions of processes on the micro-level. The involvement in these practices relies among other things on incorporating some parts of reality into them.

(4) The semantic intentionality can be observed in language use or in various discourse practices. It should be treated as a developed and specific case of the practical intentionality. The latter appears in actions controlled by feedback.

(5) The semantic or discourse intentionality is a phenomenon with two aspects. On the one hand, there are objects of knowledge and actions and also acts of representation; on the other hand, there are things that beliefs refer to (the beliefs are conditions of actions), objects and objective states of the represented world. One cannot understand all of these regardless of semantic relations that take place between them. It is not possible to handle them separately, and yet expose relations between them and obtain the adequate picture of the whole. The starting point should be the analysis of 'thick' and essentially 'world-involving practices'. This would be the only basis that one could derive upon it two aspects of intentional semantic relations that are constituted by these practices and abilities [7].

4. Human actions rely on sensorimotor abilities of the body. There is a philosophical

tradition, the phenomenological one, that accepts somatic intentionality as primary:

The intentionality is a property of the body: the body pre-reflexively but usually actively refers to the external world.

A proponent of this position was M. Merleau-Ponty. In his view the intentionality is a direct and spontaneous reaction of the body to things in the world (the body and things comprise a unity[4]). The body is intentional because it 'stands-in-relation-to', usually it moves toward various things in the world. However the 'standing-in-relation-to' or moving is not conscious or premeditated. These actions – let us repeat this – are direct and spontaneous. An unwitting move of a hand, a movement caused by force or in danger, or when one draws his hand back if the object he reaches for is too hot, are intentional. Such movements are intrinsic elements of the body, and the pre-reflexive 'motor intentionality' is inscribed in it:

A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it into its "world", and to move one's body is to aim at things through it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call, which is made upon it independently of any representation. Motility, then, is not, as it were, a handmaid of consciousness, transporting the body to that point in space of which we have formed a representation beforehand. In order that we may be able to move our body towards an object, the object must first exist for it, our body must not belong to the realm of the 'in-itself' [35, pp. 138-139].

At first the intentional move of the body in the world is an unthinking, unconscious and spontaneous movement that is expressed among other things by somatic reflexes, drives or habits. The motions of the body are not any conscious reaction of a psycho-physical subject to a stimulus, but they are something much more primary and not intermediated: either by language and meaning or by thinking and concepts or even by perception and interpreted impressions. They come out from the primitive experience of the body with the world, and that is, as Merleau-Ponty claims, the source of any sense:

In short, my body is not only an object among all other objects, a nexus of sensible qualities among others, but an object which is sensitive to all the rest, which reverberates to all sounds, vibrates to all colors, and provides words with their primordial significance through the way in which it receives them. It is not the matter of reducing the significance of the word 'warm' is not an actual warmth. It is simply my body which prepares itself for heat and which, so to speak, roughs out its outline [35, p. 236].

5. Finally, for some philosophers, the intentionality is a property of the natural world, e.g., a property of living organisms (though, as we will see soon, not only organisms). In this manner some biologists and also some naturalist philosophers see it. At the starting point one can accept the following formula for this:

The intentionality is a property of the natural world and thanks to it various elements of the world come out of themselves and cooperate with other elements in their surroundings.

Keeping in mind the general difference between the animal and plant kingdoms, one could

accept two variants of biological intentionality. The first (the weak one) would refer to animals only. In this case the intentionality would be a property of (among other things) various cognitive activities, planning, foreseeing or instinctive animal behaviors. Nevertheless this restriction seems to be very controversial because plants also perform some activities connected with coming out of themselves and with, e.g., cognitive exploration of the environment. Hence one can spread the intentionality also for other organisms, like protista, plants and fungi, and treat it (the strong variant) as a property of the nature itself: the natural world is ordered, its elements are closely bound together and its development is purposeful[5]. The fundamental here is the fact of directing or transcending, i.e. of coming out of oneself. Every piece of the natural world that is directed toward a thing or set to collect information about a thing is intentional.

Some philosophers interpret the intentionality with biological terms. R. Millikan belongs here. She claims that the intentionality should be analyzed independently from the content of mind, rationality and consciousness. It is so because the intentionality ('ofness', 'aboutness') is based on natural relations that are external to the subject. For the correct understanding of the intentionality, Millikan proposes to use the concept of function, especially the proper function. The latter in reference to various organisms, organs, tools, and also thoughts and language are an undoubtedly biological property: it is a variable dependent on the conditions in the given environment. The intentionality is an X of organs, thoughts, language and other phenomena that relies on the way in which they fulfill their proper function [36, 37].[6]

In the Polish literature among others B. Sadowski and J.A. Chmurzyński in their article 'Biologiczne mechanizmy zachowania' (*Biological Mechanisms of Behavior*) use the term 'intentional moves' ('ruchy intencjonalne'). It refers to various primitive instinctive and conditioned behaviors of organisms.

> The strength of a drive determines the intensity of performed actions. When the drive that controls the given action is still weak the relevant action appears in the opening form—the intentional move. (…) Intentional moves often derive from instinctive activities. (…) The term 'intentional move' covers also all the other conditioned reactions, e.g. raised by fear [49, p. 361].[7]

Stephen Mumford is braver. He offers an understanding of intentionality that includes also the physical. The intentionality in this domain is suggested by dispositional terms: 'increasing', 'decreasing', 'frangible', 'soluble'.

> An alternative has recently been offered. It is radical and challenging. It is the claim that the physical world, and not solely the mental, includes the phenomenon of intentionality. Certain properties, those usually understood as powers, potencies or dispositions, are said to be distinguished from categorical properties in virtue of being directed towards certain possible manifestations when a particular set of conditions are realized. This is the main contention in recent work by U.T. Place. It offers new ways of understanding dispositions, how the physical world works and the nature of causal interactions [40, pp. 215–225].

Conclusion

As one can see in the above overview (that is necessarily sketchy and tendentious, e.g. D. Dennett was ignored) various philosophers interpret the intentionality in different ways and they attribute it to different things: thoughts and other mental states, consciousness, mind, brain, body, language, creations of culture, natural phenomena. Here is not the place for a detailed presentation and

defending my own position. Besides it is not necessary because it is not unexampled. According to my deepest conviction Brentano was right – there is one primary intentionality and it is the intentionality of mental states and consciousness. The intentionality of language, works of art, maps, thermostats etc. is secondary and it is possible to explain by the former (that is irreducible to anything) and not vice versa.

There is no doubt that we are a part of the natural world. As a result of the development of the more and more composite world, anthropoid apes appeared. In some respects modern human is not different from apes: we share about 98% with gorillas and chimps. The difference is in the size and the organization of the brain. The brain of a chimpanzee weighs about 400g whereas a human one about 1300g. Minds appear upon the activity of brains. Brains different in size and organization generate different minds. The gradual growth of human brain is the effect of evolution and it is the resultant of a few factors: diversity (genetic mutability), natural selection, isolation and accidental events.

Additionally, it is worth highlighting two things: first, animals explore the external environment intensively and cooperate with it, they are conscious beings, and their consciousness is also intentional. So it seems that the intentionality – the same as consciousness – can be gradable: there is the weak intentionality of animal organisms and the strong intentionality of man (it appears in such intentional creations like works of literature and art). Second, the natural world, evolutionary mechanisms in it, bodies or brains do not evince any intentionality. At best (for example in mechanisms of adaptive fitness, selection) one can talk about a form of pre-intentionality. Therefore most of all there are: the pre-intentionality in nature, the primary intentionality in mind and the meta-intentionality (the secondary one) in creations of culture.

One of the most important questions is how nature can produce intentional mental states? Today, scientists and philosophers should focus and work on this problem together.

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Notes:

1. Some philosophers have distinguished different kinds or types of theories of intentionality. W. Lyons critically analyzed modern approaches: the instrumentalist approach, the representationalism, the teleological account, the purest functionalism. He also recognized a few levels of intentionality: (1) the level of brain (the brain has the weakest intentional power); (2) the behavioural version of intentionality with central role of sensory experience; (3) the level of language, and (4) the holistic level of 'whole person performance' [34]. Considering intentionality from an externalist perspective, P. Le Morvan has distinguished between three basic kinds of intentionality (in the case of seeing), which he calls 'transparent', 'translucent', and 'opaque' [33]. See also: J.N. Mohanty [38, 39].

2. Some philosophers claim: many mental states exhibit intentionality but not all (pain, anxiety, depression, elation, for example, are not intentional). The claim is called anti-intentionalism. E. Husserl, J. Searle, G. Strawson, N. Block, C. Peacocke have defended different forms of anti-intentionalism.

3. Sellars explained the inception of the concept of thought in his science fiction story on Ryle's ancestors and Jones' case. Ryle's ancestors possess a language that the basic descriptive vocabulary of it refers to space-

temporal objects. They also can perform such operations like: conjunction, disjunction, negation, quantification or conditionals. According to Sellars, all of this is not enough to talk about experiences and thoughts of one's own or of anybody else – tools of semantic discourse are necessary yet; see [55, pp. 178–189].

4. This unity was discussed already by I. Kant, and afterwards by E. Husserl. The latter finally distinguished the intentionality of an act (of our judgments and conscious attitudes) from the intentionality that works implicitly (*fungierende Intentionalität*) and creates the natural and pre-predicative unity of the world and our life. This primary unity had been noticed but not discovered. The main purpose of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy was to expose it.

5. Purposefulness has very different interpretations in biology and philosophy; see, e.g., [45].

6. Similarly M. Okrent explains the intentionality with the biological. Nevertheless he uses the concept of purpose rather than function. The intentionality is fontally inscribed in the teleology of the natural world; see [42].

7. „Siła popędu decyduje o natężeniu wykonywanych działań. Gdy popęd 'sterujący' danym zachowaniem jest jeszcze słaby, odpowiednie działanie pojawia się w zaczątkowej postaci – ruchu intencjonalnego. (…) Ruchy intencjonalne często wywodzą się od zachowań instynktownych. (…) Mianem ruchów intencjonalnych określa się również wszelkie inne zaczątkowe reakcje popędowe, np. zachodzące pod wpływem strachu" [49, p. 361].

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Rhetoric Tradition and Democracy:
Isocrates' Role in Ancient Greek Political Idea.
Start Point of Western Political Philosophy

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Abstract:
Political participation and the public education that have always been deployed to support the incipient progress of the civic life are revived in the modern political discourses. It has been believed that the age of pre-Socrates was the age of the Sophists whose acrid fallacy works occupied the political sphere, a malaise in government. However, speaking non-traditionally in the modern pedagogical system, there were some pre-Socratic thinkers and political philosophers/orators who's works are the backbone of modern discourse on this matter. It will be examined whether any part of the classical rhetoric apparatus can be recovered and put to a good practice in the modern education and modern political participation. This point will be illustrated, furthermore, in this paper by alleging the importance of rhetoric, its role in Ancient Greek Democracy, and its influence on the modern concepts of power and democracy, as a continual element in a historical-political life. The further consideration is whether there was any democratic *Polis* existed in Ancient Athens and then, if there was, what characteristics it consisted of. Moreover, whether such concept can or should be considered in modern political discourses. In this sense, the liberal, non-dogmatic strain of the sophistry of Isocrates tradition urges us to indicate that the findings of this educational principles are, if not necessary, but adjutant complementary metes to our modern political knowledge of the states. In the end, it is inquired to see comparatively that how the tradition of rhetorical art and the concept of power in the Ancient Greek society have pertained to the modern democratic elements and whether we are able to empower this influential element in modern states.
Keywords: Isocrates, political power, political rights, virtue, democracy, rhetoric, education

[t]he "highest kind of rhetoric [is] that which deals with the greatest affairs and, while best displaying the ability of those who speak, brings most benefit to those who hear."
Panegyricus, 4

1. The Sophists: Ambitious, Greedy, and Neglecting the Truth

After the Homeric period and before the well-known appearance of Ancient classical philosophers, an important turning point had taken place in the Athenian society. It was the political participation of the majority, or at least a benevolent intention to do so. In such changing culture that gradually

placing the rights to participate in the public debate in the hand of the many rather than the few, sophistical rhetoric presented through the appearance of the sophists was a valuable skill and a useful instrument that both part of the power, one was the mythic aristocrats and precipitous democrats could use profitably. Some have argued that Sophistical movement of the 5th B.C. century was turning point, which occurred against those natural philosophers who were solely concerned with the ultimate substance and atoms, and bewildered by the nature surrounding them. This interpretation is plausible, yet the point is that the amusement continued till the pre-Socratic philosophers all began to overlook the nature of human beings. That is why we see some strong opposition against that change from the thinkers in that period and before.

Protagoras's great achievement is to illustrate that the measure of all things is only a human being [35], 152[a], [38], 14:28-29. And it is likely to say that, that was a turning point, which happened in that period to bring the attention of his contemporaries away from nature and toward man himself.

It was with this movement that most of the constitutional thoughts about human beings changed too. Within this movement, the primary consideration was the excellence of human beings. *Arête*, because of its transitive state, has not remained as it was *viz.* merely a notion of bodily function, but was considered essential to political participation. Thus, it literally became an indication of good character [32, pp. 27-31]. With the gradual growth of political life in Athena and the growing desire for more civic education, the first generation of the sophists was more concerned with being successful in the popular realm of society, but still there was a significant difference among the proposed explanations on the idea of *Arête*. Being successful became a cornerstone of every political activity, so the virtue of a person as well as a citizen was regarded as an excellence and as a power with which one could win the political debates.

2. Ethical Value of *Arête*: Pre-Socratic Philosophers and the Fifth Century Enlightenment

The tradition of seeking truth through the strategic methods began subtly in the fifth century, but political considerations changed the overall tendency to what ethical notions should be about. Plato, in one of his famous dialogues, mentioned Protagoras [20] as one of the first teachers, among whom I call them First Generation of Sophists, e.g. Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, Thrasymachus, Lycophron, Callicles, Antiphon, and Cratylus. He was primed in turning the attention of the philosophers from Nature to the human beings, through the highlighting the facility of language. Protagoras extracts the domain language in craft and entered it in the political wisdom [37, p. 187]. He believed that he taught an art to young men [11, 316[b]] with which they were being able to arrange their own lives and could participate in public life through their deeds and words [18]. The idea behind that is the relation between the skills in using the language and the skill in understanding the principle of the justice, which is correctly highlighted by him, is the power (εξουσία) in itself in every democratic state:

> the one who studies with me will learn to exercise sound judgment in political affairs, showing how he may be most powerful (δυνατωτατος) in conducting the business of the city both in speech and action [11, 318[e]–319[a]].

With more focus on the word 'δυνατωτατος', one of the most interesting combination of the physical power and the capability of non-physical power in human being, which is the ability to speak, appears [39, p. XV]. The recognition of such capability may be the first indicator of the concept of 'power to'. The potentiality of the speaking is requires not only the physical practicing but also non-physical one in the manner of rhetorical skills which focus on the one's capability to affect based on her autonomous will. As the consequence of this ability, the phenomenon of political debates emerged which contributes to the political power and democratic process.

However, Isocrates stressed that his teaching is practical and is aimed at preparing young men to be the *gentleman* [33, p. 4]. Here, the common essential character of the rhetoric and the political participation were highlighted by the Isocrates were he argued more concretely than Protagoras on the active political role of the individuals. In this sense, the act of correct sophistical movement was to prepare others the political, legal and social issues of their states effectively. Moreover, it was a huge contribution to the civic education. Based on the principles of liberal rights, it is arguably one of the main foundations of a democratic state. The focus in the period of the first generation of sophists was on the affairs of the *Polis,* or the state. The intense political activities of the sophists and the usefulness of the rhetorical skill is esoterically implemented in the Callicles' critics of the philosophers, where he exaggeratedly highlights the difference between the rhetorical and philosophical tradition in respect to the state's political affairs:

> If a man is exceptionally gifted and yet pursues philosophy far on in life, he must prove entirely unacquainted with all these accomplishments requisite for a gentleman and a man of distinction. Such a man know nothing of the laws for their cities, or of the language they should use in their business association both public and private with other men, or of human pleasure and appetites, and in a word they are completely without experience of men's characters. And so when they enter upon any activity public or private they appear ridiculous [11, *Gorgias*, 484^{c-d}].

However, the spirit of true political activity was ruined by the theme of becoming popular merely through rhetorical skills. Thus, the political activity took the fated road. It became popular for each person who was able to skillfully and persuasively convinces others about the unjust ideas, using 'the tricks' of rhetoric and consequently win the debate, without considering what *the characteristics of that debate* really consist of. It was in this point of view that Isocrates criticized the Sophists. Since they "value all of moral excellence and happiness so little" [22, I. 4] to gain the fame and money through social victories. Moreover, with social victories, albeit small, one was able to gain rights and honors. Those who gained more victories in the speech-fights over important social matters regarded as famous and popular figures. This area of activities is specified as, and I shall call it, the activities related to the Second Generation of Sophists. It was in this period that the focus of the sophistical movement changed from the affair of *Polis* to the affair of the mind. Indeed, the tradition of seeking the truth in both Ethical and political activities separates the first and second generation of the Sophists.

3. Revolution of Socrates: Transitioning from natural Thought to Moral Thought

While, the second generation of the sophists was busy with their political activities and was scrimmaging around for success in political debates; the ethical notions and values were merely presented in words, but not in deeds. "To the sophists, however, virtues and truth were negligible considerations. Their efforts were bent on a display of rhetorical virtuosity" [3, p. 24]. This method, rather than a strategic, is the tactic one, which is more relying on the opportunities for reaching the foundation of power, cf. [36, p. 50]. Here, we can see that the concept of 'power to' as an ability and the concept of 'power of' as an act based on the autonomous will and scoop of capability produces a democratic recognition in incipient political societies. However, there were some other thinkers who searched for the truth. They had a different ideas and perspectives toward the knowledge and power, and the way to convey it to the others through rhetoric. Unlike the second generation of Sophists, they started with metaphysical issues like 'knowing the world outside of us'. They were concerned with discovering the truth, whether it was material or immaterial. Then, in this direction, they moved back more toward the human soul in the age of 'political participation fever'; namely Prodicus[i] and Heraclitus[ii]. This movement, at this time, was based on the place of the human beings in metaphysical view according to the links between human's intellect, the place of

Logos and the place of truth. Such concept is empowered by the recognition of *Logos* and its role in socio-political life.

As debates over nature lost steam, Human-affairs' debates gained in strength. Socrates was the first one, who considered virtues and other Ethical-rational notions in their real senses. Through his endeavors in ancient Athenian society, the period of ignorance – which was based on the idea of deeds for the sake of fame and religion – was surpassed. Socrates was not completely successful against the other opinions of his society, as many of those opinions took their strong account from the traditions and the history. Nevertheless, he was the pioneer of a long road, which is still evident today in our modern society.

Socrates was the first thinker that claims that one act foolishly and wickedly since he does not 'know' what is best for him. Thereby, the political debates have been considered ever since, by most of the thinkers after him, more seriously and more concretely on the normative analytical way. Since Socrates' period on, most of the ethical virtues such as friendship, valor, honesty, just, and discipline have been reinterpreted, constantly respected as it should be under the practical wisdom category. The concept of such virtues in the sixth century and early fifth century B.C. differed notably from the earlier periods, but in some aspect, footsteps of the earlier concepts still can be seen in the changed Socratic period. In this view, we can regard this transition as the *gradual inner revolution of ethical notions*.

Some important interpretations of Ancient Athenian works, for instance, Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre, Julia Annas, Geneviere liyo and Terence Irwin, are now garnering attention. It seems that the concept of virtue, in Ancient Greece, was not as shallow a notion as had been previously argued.[iii] The process of enriching the notion of virtue can help us to better understand how to analyze the notion of virtue in respect to the time. There were 4 important elements to this conceptual and practical change:

(i)   Poems and tragedies of Homer,
(ii)   Rhetorical skills of sophists
(iii)   Skeptics thinkers
(iv)   Classic Philosophers, e.g. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.

Ancient Greek philosophers stressed virtue as a goodness of the human's soul. They believed that virtue must be realized and practiced throughout one's life. Virtue, by its very nature, should not remain merely a theoretical doctrine, but also must be considered in a practical way, since its essence is intrinsically practical. Realizing the good and acting in accordance with the virtue that aims at good indicates that the very usage of virtue, not only limits the function of theoretical wisdom, but also relates to function of practical wisdom, i.e. the power of legislation (for both moral agent and political community), and the power of carrying it out in an individual way of life as well as in a social way of life by both individuals' will and by political authority.

Despite that virtue is the cornerstone of Virtues Ethics; the defenders of this branch of ethical philosophy have not presented the exact interpretation of virtue. We shall not concern ourselves with the differences, but we will consider their common points. What they all have in common is the fact that virtue is connected to the habit and ration and can be flourishing in the human's soul. It is not deniable that the flourishing of the human's soul, according to this concept of political-ethical philosophy, is impossible without the social way of life, i.e. active political life in *Polis*. Thus, virtue is one of the main and necessary elements of having a good city-state.

4. Overview of pre-Plato ambiance: Isocrates

It is a commonly held belief that modern political philosophy should be traced back to the schools of Ancient Greece. Most of the research, produced by modern academics is focused on those ancient Greek philosophical schools of Aristotle and the schools of Plato and Socrates. But as I argue, there are other influential thinkers, philosophers, and

statesmen who played important roles in forming and enriching the ideas of ethics and politics in ancient Greece. I allege that Plato's thoughts, especially in politics, trace back, not only to Socrates but also to pre-Socratic political thinkers like Isocrates.

Indeed, because of the public fever for political participation, by the end of the fifth century B.C., any so-called political structure based on the merit and elites person were unambiguously carrying notions of unjust and illegitimate one. To be more specific about the opponents of these structures, we have to say that the whole mass tried to fight against it and to establish a participatory authority of the *demo* in which all of the people can be a part, *viz.* the government, which is of the people, by the people and for the people. This is the only sort of government that guarantees the desire of the *demo* due to its knotted foundation with its subjects as its body. But that was not how philosophers like Plato and Aristotle ideologically wanted to establish their *Utopia* and *Polis*.

However, there was another, not completely, opposite trend can be traced at the end of the fourth century B.C. by one of a younger contemporary figure of Socrates called Isocrates. Parallel with Socrates, Isocrates was the first person who talks about the same *erudition* that Socrates does, but with more focus on the ability of the rhetoric skills, its role in a specific political situation and the worthwhile ends it can achieve. Hence, there is a strong common point between Isocrates and Greek philosophers in the foundation of humans' affair that can be traced through the Socrates of Plato, and then Aristotle's thoughts.

5. Orator or philosopher

As I have previously depicted, in our historical approach to the ancient Greek revolution of thought and the socio-political life: the ability to speak, was i) related to the excellence of the body, the concept of 'power of' ii) at the top among the skills and excellences, the concept of 'power to' and iii) man could gain it to be successful in all aspects of his civic life, the concept of 'power over'.

Due to the political participation fever in newfangled democracy in Athens, it was up to each individual's power of speech to be successful in social-political participation, which took place in the context of debates. It was for the first time that the multitude, regardless of being noble, blue blood or rich, had a chance to make their voice hear effectively in the public debates and more importantly, in political decision-making. Therefore, it was necessary for people to be familiar or even be an expert in the art of speaking. Through "technical rhetoric", their demands if well-presented could get a good response from the society although not everyone could make it. Senators who were skillful in rhetoric and could present their point effectively often achieved success and celebrity status [10, p. 12], [23]. This skill continues to be important in high-level political debates, social-political spheres, as well as in many judiciary and economic institutions. In a sense, anyone who was skillful as an orator was essentially carrying a secret weapon that could bring him full success in all aspects of his social endeavors. Thus, what made Athens a *rhetorical society*, parallel to a democratic society, was its scope and goals of persuasion. In this way, rhetoric served as the most important capability to effect for individuals in the Ancient Greek *Polis*, an instrument to get into the power position.

Later on, the Athenians became more concerned with two aspects of *logos:* influencing human thoughts and direct intended effects on human actions. For being familiar with this tradition, we have to take a quick look at the starting-point of it.

Heraclitus

Heraclitus is a pioneer in the tradition of surveying *the Logos* and its place in human life. The *Logos*, since then, became a cornerstone of the Ancient and medieval philosophy. What made Heraclitus' thoughts unique among his fellow philosophers in the pre-Socratic period was his method for seeking the truth and examining it thoroughly. Although he remained concerned with the problematic points of his predecessors regarding the philosophy of nature, he also stressed the importance of human nature and the role of human beings. Upon the publication of the Fragments [29], Heraclitus argued in the I (D.1, M.1) Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos VII. 132 that *τον δε λόγος τον´ δ εοντος,* i.e. the '*Logos* is eternally valid', which it strongly emphasize on its place in human life as well as the cosmos. The characteristics of its essence were effective also based on the argument that '*γινομένων γαρ πάντων κατα, τον λόγος*', i.e 'all things come to pass in accordance with this Logos.' One likely interpretation that focuses on highlighting the elements of this fragment is to overweight notion of the *πάντων* (pánton: of all things),[iv] which I argue**,** that has a strong relationship, on the one hand, with the intellect, and on the other hand, with the natural law. Although, not relying on the traditional and famous translation, we can find the opportunity to focus on the *κατα* which not only means "in accordance with", but also can be translated to "through", "down from" and more importantly as "per", which shows the *Logos* as an origin and as the end. The importance of this point of view implies that relation between the Logos and the intellectual activity of the political beings.

Within this context, Heraclitus challenged other thinkers to consider the nature of the human beings and his role in accordance with the *Logos* and the importance of the *Logos* in the personal and political life.

> Speaking with understanding they must hold fast to what is shared by all, as a city holds to its law, and even more firmly. For all human laws are nourished by a divine one. It prevails as it will and suffices for all and is more than enough [29, XXX (D. 114, M. 23a) Stobaeus III.1.179].

Yet, the question remains, how does the idea of the *Logos* leads human beings to conclude that their role is more important than they had previously thought?

One of the most famous fragments of Heraclitus is:

> Over those who step into the same river, different and different water flows [28, p. 52], [14, p. 471].

Remarkably, the dominance of nature and its characteristic of change was the center of attention for pre-Socrates' philosophers, and obviously with no exception for Heraclitus. Indeed, the matter of change is one of the important elements in the metaphysical idea of Heraclitus and his fellow philosophers. After the age of Heraclitus the idea of returning to the logic and denying all the perceptual sense of human beings began with the exaggerated interpretation of "the movement and the change" doctrine that pre-Socratic philosophers, such as Parmenides and Zeno of Elea (c. 490 – c. 430 BC) presented, cf. [1, 17:40-52]. Thus, the consequence was that the only thing that matter was the logical conclusion, and had nothing to do with the perception of the outside world. Heraclitus disagrees.

Several times, Heraclitus insists that humans are incapable of observing *the truth*: "Not comprehending, they hear like the deaf. The saying is their witness: absent while present" [29, (D. 34, M.2)]. Thus, only a few people can understand the real meaning of

his philosophy. We can also see from the form and the style of his survived fragments and writing that those frequent skillful synthetic ambiguities embellished by linguistic density and resonance, are not just a matter of chance, but as a method to leave the ideas in obscurity in order to pass the knowledge of the truth to those whom deserve it.

However, how does this aforementioned fragment lead the philosophers to the truth of *unity* rather than instability and relativism?

Nowadays, Heraclitus is mostly discussed when considering his "doctrine of flux" which emerged from the famous fragment mentioned above. In fact, it was the unity in source not the matter of the change, which was important for Heraclitus. Considering the other saying of the Heraclitus and his whole systematic idea is unavoidably vital in understanding the truth about his esoteric writing.

> Although this account [Logos] holds forever, men ever fail to comprehend, both before hearing it and once they have heard. Although all things come to pass in accordance with this account [Logos], men are like the untried when they try such words and works as I set forth, distinguishing each according to its nature and telling how it is. But other men are oblivious of what they do awake, just as they are forgetful of what they do asleep [29, p. 49].

According to this saying, we can be sure that Heraclitus argued about the truth that latent in Nature, which has been not yet accessed by anyone else. Here, what I notably emphasis is on the relation between nature and logos with the ration of the human being and the laws accordance with it. Despite his idea about the essence of the things, when he speaks about the truth, he purposely avoids any material aspects. Although the role of the fire is revealed in this account as the source of matter and its movement, Heraclitus has the idea of the *Logos* in his mind. This for him is on one hand an actual constituent, and on the other, the order and discipline of all. These two fundamental principles of Heraclitus thoughts can be seen very closely to the philosophical principle of Ancient Iranian religion called Zoroastrianism (ca. 1200 BC.), in which the fire respected as the essence of the universe and the *Ahura Mazda* (Illuminating Wisdom) and *Angra Mainyu* (Destructive Spirit) considered as two concepts of the immaterial order of the universe which are the *Logos*. (We will discuss these two concepts in Heraclitus' idea in the following text.)

The Combination of Stability and Flux

So, what is the *Logos* in Heraclitus thoughts? And can that actually lead us to the movement of attention of philosophers from Nature to the human beings? We must note that the word of λόγος (the *Logos*) first used by Heraclitus. From the direct translation, it is almost impossible to allege that this word is totally equal with "word", "speak" or "account". To consider the meaning of the *Logos* is to conduct epistemological research in the philosophical structure of Heraclitus's thought. Unable to directly translate the *Logos*, we are able to get to understand it from this point of view, that the *Logos* is shared or common in the whole:

> Although the account is shared, most men live as though their thinking were a private possession [29, p. 29].

For Heraclitus, the notion of "the change" and "the movement" brought out another idea, which helped him to have a better view to the matter of the whole: the idea of uncertainty about the relativity of human judgments. This relativism was caused by the failure of the

sense perceptions and continues to this day. Heraclitus stressed this point in the following fragment:

> The sea is the purest and foulest water: for fish drinkable and life sustaining; for men undrinkable and deadly [29, D.61, M.35, p. 61].

However, he could not accept the absolute incoherency of the things, which stems from perceptions influenced by nature. The world was regarded by him as a world in Flux. However, he observed that what emerges from the relation between each component of the world is a systematic dependence. This idea was a departure point for him to say that:

> The way up and down is one and the same [29, p. 75]
> But with a view at the change.

What is interesting though is that, at the time he is arguing his doctrine of Flux, the characteristics of *stability*, on the one hand, and the *superiority*, on the other hand, were the most contentious one. The doctrine of Flux is assumed to represent an essential characteristic of Nature, that this essential element orders all beings from above and can be interpreted as a common principle in Heraclitus thought. Yet, we have to ask whether this common principle comes from nature or is the nature itself?

This is related to the assumption that "Nature loves to hide" [29, p. 33] and simultaneously to the assumption that "It belongs to all men to know themselves and to think well" [29, XXIX (D. 116, M. 15f = 23e) Stobaeus III.5.6, p. 41]. Later interpretations of the Heraclitus' idea abstractly ended to the idea of *Natural Law* or *The Law of Nature*. There are two fundamental features in natural law theory. One reveals the divine aspect of natural law, evinced in a way that it amputated this law from what today has been called 'positive law'. Positive law has been based on human decisions and traditions, for specific situations. The second is that, by considering *the law of nature*, there must be a *de facto* receiver of the natural law. The question is, what is the essential characteristic of the *de facto* receiver of this natural law? This question leads to the point that, the natural law is directly related the role of human intellect. In this view, human intellect works in accordance with this common law, as Heraclitus called it, or natural law, according to modern scholars. Its function is to receive the fundamental characteristic of *the order*. The practical faculty and its function, must be completely in accordance with what is observed within the process of understanding the *Logos*: the law that is common in Nature or the natural law. Thus, we have the *Logos*, on one hand, and the shared rationality [29, p. 43] among humans, on the other. The link between these two fundamental elements is the cornerstone of the movement that removes the attention from nature and put it back on human life. This movement caused a reorientation toward human role as an important element in nature and the right way of living in accordance with natural law. Hence, the man again has the faculty, with which to understand the *Logos* and even impose it on others- as a matter of authority and superiority. This is the most powerful link beneath the whole argument on the relation of Logos, human intellect and political life.

I have it clear how the attention of thinkers and philosophers changed and moved from the nature to the *Logos* and then from the *Logos* to the human beings – in respect to the point that the human being is regarded a part of the *Logos*. Now let us get back to the point of how this characteristic affected Isocrates' view.

6. Logos and Politics

Orators and sophists moved the goals and considerations of the society with their attentive speech-plays. In this way, the idea of their predecessors got its new form. They came to the conclusion first, that *logos* should be regarded as one of the most important aspects in human life related to its roles and its place and with respect to its direct effect on human intellect, e.g. the faculty of language. This traditional notion of the *Logos* which portrayed it more as the δυναστης (dominant principle as a ruler and master) can be seen in Isocrates' *Nicoles*, [28, Sec.6-9], [19], where can be trace back to Geogias [19, p. 15] and then Heraclitus' first Fragment. Second, that there has to be a powerful intellectual receiver of the *Logos*. And third, by knowing the power of intellect, words became an instrument with which human beings can to do *anything* [19, p. 10].

From the historical perspective, the first and the second aforementioned conclusions stressed by famous Ancient Greek Philosophers, e.g. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and also Stoics, while the third aforementioned conclusion strongly emphasized by the pre-Socratic thinkers due to political participation fevers and the high emphasis on the relation of the political decisions and the ability to speak. So, we can say that the deliberations on the first and the second conclusion were somehow later than the third one, in the process of political thoughts.

However, lets back to the philosophical discussion. The third conclusion is directly linked to the notion of the *Logos* which appears as the power of sovereignty, i.e. ἡγέομαι (hegemon) [28, Sec.6-9]. Here, The last conclusion on *Logos* highlighted by Isocrates. He illustrates the relationship between rhetoric and power based on the last notion of the *Logos*. Furthermore, by approaching to the ἡγέομαι (hegemon) function of *Logos*, Isocrates allege that the principle of social harmony, and what he concerned with was the peace and unification of his *Polis*[v], would be achieved through rhetoric, *viz.* a true rhetorical skill with respect to the Natural law and *Logos*. This advantage related to the practice of faculty of language, which has its roots in Nature, where the mechanism of the *Logos* and humans intellect connected for the political order. Moreover, what makes the Isocrates works worthy is the principle of civic education and the values of democratic state, which emerged from his, emphasizes on the links between *Logos* and ἡγέομαι and its effect in order to achieve the just ends. The hegemonic function of the *Logos* has been always accompanied by the teleological reasoning. Hitherto, these two fundamental functions help the political accomplishment through deliberation. Particularly, the combination of the strategically and tactically arguments in politics in Isocrates's school advantage to the democratic state; it will activated when a *de facto* faculty of language bring a positive outcome if it will be accompanied with *Captatio benevolentiae*'s method in rhetoric in a political discourse among the citizens.

7. Rhetoric and Politics

In another view, rhetoric is the art of properly using language to persuade, an instrument. Oratory has been regarded as a part of rhetoric and recognized as skillfully speaking in public. Here, we have to ask what modern societies have learned or not learned from incipient ancient democracy. Undoubtedly, one aspect of social liberty, i.e. freedom of speech, and recognition of individual rights, freedom of conscious and security for their lives, are the core principles of modern democratic states in the matter of individual rights and freedom for expressing ideas. This can be partially observed in both eras. Beneath this surface, however, in Ancient Athenian society, public prominences were not often achieved by the free-will election of other people based on the logical consistency, but by using their elaborated language abilities to persuade the multitude to choose them. The

ignorance of the right education depraved taste of the freedom of speech. Probably, in contrary to the freedom of speech as a common point between the modern democratic states and the ancient one, the right education is the most primary distinction between them on the matter of rhetoric. The distinction can be also related to the value-based logical argument in the modern state. What positively emerged from the rhetorical method of the Isocrates in favor of the logical-based argument in the modern state are the means of the critic, appropriation, and correction. However, The public prominences, during the emergence of second generation of sophists, were depended rather on *one man*'s ability of oratory- that is here the ability to speak elaborately- how one can sway the majority of citizens in public debates presented in the Assembly, court, public gathering or feasts to vote or to give any consent in favor of one of the litigants [22], [17, p. 3]; or in a trial, vote for proposed courses of actions or a public movement toward a specific cultural change. Hitherward, the foundation of the democracy of the ancient Greek state laid down deep into some demagoguery.

However, a great deal of the notion of rhetoric, which shaped it as an valuable political activity goes back to the Romans and more importantly, to the Ancient Greece. By looking at the Homeric poems, one can see how this skill was vital and useful. Athenian leaders in the fifth and fourth century B.C., such as Pericles, Themistocles, Solon and Cicero, or political figures like the Romanian consuls were among those successful leaders who held the power of oratory and used this ability to preserve their place at the top [33]. Rise and fall of the rhetoric skills are not only related to one period, but it is the product of the historical process [36, p. 12]. In a world without any mass communication systems, without media, newspaper or television, let alone Internet blogs and other communication facilities, speaking in public was an essential element, if it was not the only one, of political participation and politics. The achievement in this field is not because of the communication facilities that we have in our modern days.

In ancient time, people traveled thousand miles to watch a public speaking competition or a speech from a famous orator/politician. The communication would play a key role, and what is important is that communication succeeds not because of the different technology's facilities, but because of the art of speakers and the deliberative connection that it makes between the specified circumstances and the audience through their logic and emotions. Communication indicates the common sense of deliberation and influence of logos in social life. It was in this sense that the orators/politicians were the rock stars of their time, and still they are. The art of oratory and the bond that it makes between orator and the people, this principle, still is a primary one in our modern society with which one can establish an intimate relationship with the audience. Thus, as it was, it is necessary to have experts of speaking skillfully in public debates and in politics. Since, this process is a natural process of systematic practice in the very culture of the political activity and its element is based on what the society consists of: the people as socio-political animals. Based on this idea, there would be possibility if we argue against some modern societies that have been growing experts in business or in military, because their main idea regarding success was restricted primarily to the high level of money making skills or security and war. The most contribution to the political progress is the critical mind of citizens, i.e. the political body of the state, and their effectiveness by their participation and simultaneously, their philosophical education. The range of negations in regard to the matter of encouraging, producing and criticizing the political activities is the cause of major ignorance on philosophical and rhetorical aspects of education that is more crucial for the modern democratic nation-states.

8. The Limitations and Weak Points of Ancient Greek Art of Rhetoric

This comparative approach urges us to examine both sides of the subject. Thus, this aspect is a turning point for us to elucidate what consequences it has if the mere rhetorical skill regarded as the only required skill in the social-political activity. By showing this point, I will be able to lighten up the ideas that caused the difference between the first and the second part of Isocrates life. Moreover, it will indirectly help us to recognize the differences between the speeches that have been held today.

It seems that the oratory began with the daily activity of some people to tell stories for the public. This activity can be traced back to the early Homeric period. The art of telling stories, in the late Homeric period and after it, got its new way toward telling the histories as well. The histories mixed in the context of stories. Those who had the job as historians and poets usually spoke in the public places for presenting their works. Nevertheless, their works were in the narrative form and presented by a close imitation of Attic dialect [3, pp. 11-12]. By the outset of Ancient Athenian "democracy", these public speakers, by the mean of the historian, engaged in the interesting public political debates through their speeches. These speeches gain its advocates and became as *logographoi*.[vi] Nevertheless, the next level of oratory was concerned at its early ages as a skill of speech-writing and as an activity to present these speeches in the public places. Hence, the link between two aspects of historiography and poetry helps orator to easily engage her speech with the current political debates. Thus, oratory built an interesting affiliation between the historiography, poetry, and democracy. However, this method has been always accompanied with reliance more on the *emotional aspect* of the speech. The relationship between historiography and political debates can be seen in the transition of the word *μυθώδης* (*mythōdēs*) from "fairy-tale"[vii] to "flattering" in the patriotic political stories [16], [30, 11.1, pp. 35-39]. By entering the political debates in orators' speeches, the function of oratory got closer to the rhetoric one, yet it is still an open debate of our time.

With regard to the emotional aspect of the speech as the common weak point of oratory and rhetoric, the first critic of the early rhetoric principle, however, followed necessary by considering the *logographoi*. Most of the times, the combination of *logographoi* with oratory cause presenting untrustworthy account, because it is based on the unreal situation or at least combined with these situations. The most important inclination for orator to do so is, for instance, from avarice or from ambition to the pursuit of gain, which pointed out by Plato:

> If anyone be held to be trying to reverse the course of just pleas in the minds of the judges, or to be multiplying suits unduly or aiding others to do so, whoso wishes shall indict him for preserve procedure, and he shall be tried before the court of select judges, and if he be convicted, the court shall determine whether he seems to be acting *from avarice or from ambition*; and if from the latter, the court shall determine for how long a period such an one shall be precluded from bringing an action against anyone, or aiding anyone to do so; while if avarice be his motive, if he be an alien he shall be sent out of the country and forbidden to return on pain of death, but if he be a citizen he shall be put to death because of his *unscrupulous devotion to pursuit of gain* [11, *Laws*, 11. 938[a-c]; emphasis added].

If we do not consider the element of democratic state here, still there is open to critics. What Plato does not count in this text, is how the liberty of speech in expressing the idea is crucial to the implement of the reciprocal argument in which the essence of the political participation latent.

The second critic is that, usually the narratives that based on histories, which presented in public debates, have the lack of *logics*. Moreover, when this method of oratory entered the realm of rhetoric in democratic debates, initially used the *communis opinio* by presenting it back to the people. Here, the problem of δόξα (*doxa* or the common belief of the *demo*) is one of the most contentious ones that almost every political theorist has been concerned about. However, it seems that at the same time this problem was one of the tools for being dominant in the speeches over the *demo*, the concept of 'power over' were fortified by the art of rhetoric. The question is whether it is a wicked ability or not, yet the rhetoric as a mere instrument will be justified with its moral significance which cannot be find intrinsically within it but in the action and aims of political actors. The modern example of this wicked ability in speeches can be found in every religious revolution. Even without the oratory skill, the instrumental usage of the *doxa, viz.* over-using the common belief or popular opinion of the people to achieve a certain goal, as the people persuaded indirectly, can be effective. Such aspect can be seen recently throughout the last few decades, which caused revolutions that took place namely in the Middle East. These are the major pragmatic political consequences. The result would be a strong encountering movement against the right form of rhetoric in religious or military regimes. Such antagonism of rhetoric education is due to the liberty principles that it requires and due to the democratic improvement changes that it will cause. We don't have to wait for such experience in recent years, Sparta for instance, expelled the orators through the legal mechanism of alien acts (ξενηλασία) [36, p. 16].

The third critic of rhetoric is when it regarded as the mere skill of a statesman with considering the subject of the oratory. This critic is related to the historical fact and to the essence of its development. It stress on the fact that the rhetoric emerged in a culture of competition, normalized through the organization of the Greek Olympic Games and institutionalized in the heart of public debates. According to this idea, oratory has been always considered by its audience. There would be no oratory and rhetoric effort if there was not any gathering of people, and in follow, if there was not any communal consent about a debate, recognition of others and value in public deliberation. Hence, if an orator considers her function as a *mere rhetoric* function, she sees it in the concept of *agōnis* (competition). This is dangerous for democratic *Polis*, nation-states, because if the power of persuasion be free from the moral values and its moral significant, it negate the modern law of the nature, the subjects (= either they are the audiences or other citizens) would be treated like those who be treated as competitors in a physical competition. Consequently, the sovereign or orator will see them as the *subjects of manipulation* and there will be a small place left for seeing his own good as equals to others. This point delicately showed by Plato. In this sense, Plato makes a taxonomical comparison between the athletics and rhetoric in *Euthydemus* when he talks about two Sophists:

> First of all they are first-rate in fighting with their bodies and battling with all comers- they are themselves master at fighting in armors, and can make anyone else expert who would pay their fees. Next, in the battle of the law courts they are champions; they can compete themselves and teach others to speak, and they can compose speeches suitable to deliver in court [11, 271d-72a].

Socrates, here, invoke the violation that lies beneath the athletics and armor competitions, then guides the argument to the point that those violation in the *fighting* which placed in the public debates [11, 273[d]]. Thus, rhetoric as its function alone and as dominating its subjects in democratic *Polis*, can be recognized with the same principles and intention that can be seen is competitions and its competitors.

The fourth critic of mere rhetoric is a teleological objection. Rhetoric is aimed to an end. That end, regarded to its *mere* method, is persuasion. With a presupposition that if the aim of persuasion through rhetoric is good for the society, rhetorical skills still insufficient by themselves to handle the "good" for the *Polis*. However, the end of rhetoric in the context of public debates must be regarded in a more far-sighted way. The end of rhetoric must be integrated with the end of the public debates. In this respect, the end of the public debates, through the art of how to address the debates, is in a way that the consequence will be in a favor of those who concern about that debate: the ruler and the citizens [11, *Euthydemus*, 289a- 291a].

The fifth critic is that because of the attractiveness of the speech to be listening to, orators have to adorn their presentations with passionate statements. Through this process, public speakers sometimes ignored the exaggeration, which arises from most of the passionate statements.

By following the element of the exaggeration, the other critic comes necessarily. The sixth critic is about essential element of human communication by practicing his faculty of language. This essential element, which has been sought in each investigation and argument, is truth. Just as the Sophists traveled from location to location, so too they traveled from idea to idea [36, pp. 24-25]. We cannot examine rhetorical speeches and judge about their validity in true or false category, if the Rhetorical speeches considered by the mere rhetorical essence. It means that considering rhetoric without wisdom and erudition is diverge it from the absolute and push it in the *doxa* realm. In this sense, rhetoric is Indifferent morally and philosophically to the content of the speech or argument, and this means that the orator is irresponsibility of the audience. This critic has the same root in the argument in the fourth critic. However, the first part of this critical perspective tries to ignore the philosophical aspect of the rhetorical act, exactly at the heart of its essence where rhetoric is indifference to the argument. Of course rhetoric has been used in different station of trails, different perspectives of one opinion and natural to the moral elements of the subjects, but through this doubles and ambiguity leis the foundation of being persistence on no singular perspective, trust to no given constitution and loyal to any political system or sovereignty. Pre-judiciary assumptions are contraries to the critical thinking. It has been taken for granted that a philosophical mind is adorned with the same characters, which has been found in rhetorical method.

9. Isocrates, Leadership and Political wisdom

Among the experts of rhetoric in Ancient Greece, there were some figures, who were not totally concerned with the fame or power, but had tendency for discovering the truth. They would not regard themselves sophists or orators. One of the best of them, as we have mentioned, was Isocrates (436-338). Isocrates recognized the weak points of the art of rhetoric and the problem of *doxa* in his society. He used one of his important dual critiques- critic on neglecting the truth and critic on exaggeration at the opening lines of his book *Against the Sophists*:

> If all those who undertook to teach were willing to speak the truth and not
> make greater promises than they plan to fulfill, they would not have such a
> bad reputation among the general public [22, I].

This recognition guided him to change his position from being just an orator to a political thinker. However, because of his two side characteristics of his life, scholars hardly tend to make long-term survey on his school. In fact, his idea is not well known as well as Plato and Aristotle, but they are still the most influential ideas in practice.

Isocrates was born into a prosperous family, but that was just the temporary economic situation. After the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), things had completely changed for him. His family ended up losing all of their money because of the war. He might have been a teenager when the Athenians voted in a 'very democratic way' for killing all male citizens of Thracian city of Scione: The siege of Scione (423-421 B.C.) [9]. In his youth, he became a biographer, and a speechwriter at a time when this profession was burgeoning. Thus, he made a lot of money, which contributed to fame and success. However, his ideas changed throughout this first period of his life. Similar to the other studies on the thoughts of any reformer in the history of mankind, we can certainly predict what his real intention was, especially when we understand that he did not regard himself as a sophist. This point is important since it was pretty common and popular to be a sophist in that time.

In the second period of his life, he was more inclined to engage in philosophy. His goal was neither to be eloquent in public affairs, with the genuine sense of rhetoric in practice, nor to be a sophist.

Isocrates was deeply concerned with improving the political realm. He desired to see Greece in a relatively good situation by the means of domestic and foreign policy [21]. The largest proportion of Isocrates' work contains political characteristics. He was concerned with a more philosophical and theoretical aspect of political life, which directs the pragmatic realm, and thoughts rather than presenting some fancy speech in order to become famous among the Orators. However, he still strongly believed that oratory matters, not because of its popularity, but because the state established and maintain, or even defended, through the skills of 'leadership'. And one of the main elements of a good leadership respected, as the power to shape or change the intended will of the society in a way that a leader aims to. That is impossible unless the leader be prolific by rhetorical adornments. However, is it possible without the strong hand in the deliberative element? If this is so, still there is a distinction between the rhetorical skill and the wisdom of the leader(s) and their virtue. It seems that Isocrates understood this principle as one of the important aspects of a good state, as it showcases the main and vital qualification of his ideal statesman and his thoughts about the essence of politics. Therefore, for Isocrates, "leadership" is always hanging upon a skillful eloquent man who has a *de facto* faculty of language and happened to be rightly educated.

However, one might object about the links between the Isocrates's theory of virtues and its relationship to the politics. The link between virtues and the *art* of rhetoric diverges the cornerstone of Isocrates' political idea from the later philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, that is his rejection on a strong distinguish between theory and practice. In Isocrates school education matters. However, the civic education regarded more as an art than practical knowledge and that leads to the unification of theoretical and practical wisdom for being a virtuous man. In other words, if the virtue in Isocrates school can be explicated as the art of rhetoric, then the boundaries between the philosophy and politics, and the notion between the practice and theory is obscurely twisted. Thus, the proficiency in the art of rhetoric can play a critical role to make anyone wiser. This is the main idea of recognizing the virtue (ἀρετή, *Aretē*) and art (τέχνη, *Technē*) in different perspectives. Aristotle used this principle to distinguish between the wisdom (φρόνησις, *phronēsis*), the good and the art of rhetoric. However, here we cannot discuss Aristotle's idea of rhetoric. So it will be a good complimentary work for this participation if one does that.

Traditionally, Isocrates, according to his emphasize on the importance of language and the art of rhetoric, has been called as a sophist, but it is an overly reductive way to think about his place in the tradition of western political philosophy. Like our famous Ancient Greek philosophers-Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle-, he considered himself more as a political philosopher and thinker rather than an orator or sophists, and that elucidates the real intention of his endeavors. Whether his school is of thought contributed to the major trends in philosophy or sophistic tradition remains a solemn question of today.

It has been said, that around 390 B.C., he seriously considered writing and teaching as his primary activity [17]. In most of his writing, he set forth his ideas about educational, political and

philosophical activities, which make him significant much like other important contemporary figures, such as Socrates. Isocrates wrote *hoi politikai logoi* [23, 260], [22, 21] and he explains in the summary of his career that he is dealing with "Greek, and royal and political affairs" [25, 11] How closely the life of the individual was in fact bounded up with that of the state, is unveiled in the common usage of the word πολίτενεσθυι, i.e. "to live as a citizen", instead of the bare term "to live". But in the fourth century B.C., the Athenians moved by the democratic intentions to the tumult participations and political sedition that provoked them to have more and more their own lives, selfishly pursuing their own business, and craving increasingly for the liberty to "do as they liked" for their self-preservation and self-promotion that ended most of the time in self-conceit. They lost the primary essence of a democratic state. Thus, they were living off the state rather than living *for* it and its ultimate end. It is not that mere "living in a city", *viz.* in a political community, prevents men from behaving like beasts toward one another, but living as a part of the city and persuading its ends, which included both the common good for the individual and the political community, is what makes human beings responsible citizens. This idea brought principles to the later democratic Athenian society, which was required fundamental changes in its constitution. This principle did not exist after or prior to civil society, but along with it and comes into attention with considering the debates about politicization. Isocrates saw political life as the humanizing element in the life of man, that which separates men from beasts, cf. [4,1253a 29], [12, pp. 104-109]. This idea has been used profoundly in Aristotle's theory of political community over the debate on the nature of human beings as a political animal [12].

However, Isocrates had used the same method of rhetoric, but in a private way as that was the most appropriate method for the sake of political improvement. He, just like Plato, established a school in Athens,[viii] but unlike Plato, his school relied more on a broad concept of rhetoric and practical philosophy. So, his work on any metaphysical subjects faded in this respect. He was not gaga with philosophy in a way that would disparage the rhetoric, but he used it precisely in order to introduce and establish a right way of politics. These trainings consisted of rhetorical training and practicing for good political handling [37, pp. 2-4]. Because of this idea, the first task that his school engaged was those arguments *Against the Sophists*, which also served as an advertisement for his school.

In this way, Athenian history, particularly during the age between Socrates till the end of the Epicurean, is a very interesting age for a number of reasons. The State fought to be a good political state. From one side, it was the weightiness of decision that was being urged. The decisions were sometimes about war and peace, the other times were about capital punishment. Parallel with that disposition, on the other side, the intellectual debates were handed to those who were not interested only in public speech-contests, but were more concerned with all of the things under the title of *Philsophia.*

The intellectual community at that age was addressing the current ethical and political situations of Athens and its crisis hegemony and cohesion. We can see from the works, ranging from Isocrates's W*ar and Peace* and *Against the Sophists*, Plato's *Laws* and *Republic* to Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics*, that they tried to change the undergoing flow, which was happening in Ancient Athens. Furthermore, One of the problematical points was addressing the crisis of intellectual reasoning, i.e. being wise: the problem of *Doxa* and the other problematic points was the total participation of the masses in the political debates. The result of a combination of both problems was so-called autocratic of democratic participation that usually went out of hand when the masses participate in those situations that they were not entitled to. Since, the intellectual ignorance due to the rapid political upheavals causes the disorientation of the values and principles in every constitution. Facing these problems, what Isocrates tried to establish, in regard to the πολίτενεσθυι was accompanied with the systematic democratic element of the education. Education transfers the *demo*, the people of a democratic state, which all they would have done without it, is to interference emotionally, the amenable individuals. Education provides a ground for equality of citizens in a democratic power relation and makes them apt to the deliberative political life [2]. This progressive

method was aimed to change the society from an incipient intended will of corporation to a harmonized political nation-state. In this sense, the role of speech in the educational process, on the one hand, is derived from the natural rights of individuals, and on the other hand, is derived from the essence of political participation. In the modern nation-state, the entitlement of the political participation, however, is not depends only on the freedom of the speech, but also valuable in respect to the education that possible through the link between the rhetorical skill and the moral significance of actions. This is what Isocrates grasped and tries to use it in his reformative school.

Although, there are some differences in the practical realm, between Isocrates' idea about the knowledge and those of Plato and Aristotle's, It is hard to believe that Isocrates' idea of wisdom based on an opinion that leads to the conclusion that there is no exact knowledge that can lead a man to what to say or what to do. Rather, in his view, the opinion (*doxai*) coupled with the doctrine of situational judgment as a character of a statesman, which has to have its roots in the practical wisdom, are respected as the only way for being wise [23, 271], [25, 28-29]. However, Isocrates believed that in some point, eliminating the problem of *doxa* or ignoring it are not the correct remedies, but guiding the community's *doxa* through the rhetoric and education necessitated the changes within the problem. Hitherto, we can see that his school is not a completely philosophical school like those of Plato and Aristotle but is not a mere sophistical one either. However, as it has been delineated before, he was a thinker who was only concerned with practical action. At some point, the practical actions relate strongly to the particular situations. At least, it can be assumed by considering the striving of the Isocratic, that is the core idea of his philosophy from his general statements, especially with a view to *Against the Sophists*. On the one hand, he could neither be thoughtless, conventional, and lumpen, on the other hand nor has he faced the rigors of what had been totally concerned by philosophers. His criticism in *Against the Sophists* considered several points against thoughtlessness and conventionalism of his society. The criticism of:

(i)   Sophists acts in order to make big speeches in order to teach others to be a great deceiver under the cover of teaching to be a great leader,
(ii) Unrealistic claims
(iii) Generalized the specific rules and presented it in handbooks,
(iv) Being a business man rather than who work for the improvements of the society in both levels of itinerant and high fees sophists and
(v)   Forensic rhetoric, due to the fact that, they were trying to encourage litigiousness rather than solving problems.

First, as an orator and second, as a political theorist, he tried to make harmony between rhetoric and philosophy, and then between the masses and the elites. His main goal was remained to use philosophical methods in the practice of leadership in order to bring "peace" to the *Polis*. This is so familiar a doctrine for modern democratic state, that the fundamental principle of it has made me pass by, without their due reflection, the cohesion structure of education and essence of the democratic state, i.e. liberal principle on freedom of speech, in respect to the life of citizens, on the one hand, and the harmony of the state and the virtue of the leadership, on the other.

Moreover, Isocrates's *Antidosis* is a good work to start with, because in this book, Isocrates criticizes the opinions of his fellow thinkers. In answering his critics, he revealed the true intention of the Sophists and compared their goals to his own. In this way, he critically diverged from the Sophists. He had done an important job through his work *Antidosis* and *Against the Sophists*, as he determined his position as a *political theorist*. This idea can be regarded as the first step toward the intellectual reform during the 5th and 4th century B.C. The idea can be basically interpreted as: Not going with the flow. However, Isocrates' attempts highlighted the difference between himself and other, so called thinkers, but that was not the only goal of his doctrine. In this sense, he

presented the doctrine on "peace" and "unification" of Athenian society, which must be surveyed more deeply.

Peace and Security: A Lesson from Isocrates

Isocrates was trying to conceal the individual life with the good of the state in the whole sense, but he did not mean that an individual way of life is superior to the common living of his fellow citizens. Unfortunately, he did not develop this idea in an elaborated form, as subsequent philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle did. For him, the end of political life and the end of the *Polis*, would be directly related to the soul of the *Polis* by which citizens are the primary elements [23, 21-23]. The relationship of the individual and the state- both aspects of metaphysics and practices- is vital to the process of reaching a good life and maintaining it and can be seen more vividly in the works of Plato and Aristotle.

As a teacher, Isocrates was more concerned with the political aspect of the individuals in the state, rather than a theoretical one, let alone fight for a pure *eudaimonia* in a sense that our philosophers -Plato and Aristotle- meant. He sought for the peace between the elite in a "few" sense and ordinary people in a "wide" sense; aka the wise and the ignorant. This style of education almost worked in the Athenian state, where, albeit of the democratic fever, there was little tolerance for Monarchy. Couple with this highly intoleration ambiance, there was an implicit ignorance among the multitude, which the ignorance has adorned by the ambitious element. Supposed that, Isocrates had to discursively contend the ideological hegemony of *demos* [23, p. 34]. This character can be seen elsewhere among those who believed excessively in democratic ideology or on discriminating authority [15], [13]. Isocrates, as I argue, is the founder of the synthetic between the (i) rhetoric and philosophy, (ii) patriotic and cosmopolitan discourses and (iii) the principle of the democratic and the aristocratic society. The combination of these heterogeneous plays the main role in his doctrine to make the peace, harmony and integrity of his society. What is interesting, though, is that they are determined as the ingredients of the foundation of the modern societies. However, the modern democratic state is more close to the toleration and wisdom. This element is the central diversion point between the ancient and modern democratic state, which directly takes effect from two aspects of the education and the rhetoric skills on the people. Hence, the right government, which established on the mottos of "of the people, by the people and for the people", shall well execute the rhetorical skill and well exercise the just education based on the liberty of the speech.

10. Ambiance, Method and Idea

The main components of Isocrates's ideas, just like all other political thinkers, are the *Polis* and its citizens. He, at the end of the shameful and disgracing Athenian "Social War", which was about Athenian confederacy and its colonies (355 B.C.), was concerned with the republic life; and the matter of its safety [24, 140:2] and its relation to the *Polis* itself. Indeed, when one is concerned with the relationship between *Polis* and its citizens, "the best order", the form of power relation and power structure, comes into question too.

Isocrates was not completely against the idea of democracy because democracy allowed him to speak without fear [24, 143:17]. He was, however, hoping for a different kind of democracy. Thus, despite his strong critical opinion against the democracy of his time, unlike Plato and, this is the key point, he thought that democracy was a way that a *Polis* can be perfectly ruled too. And more importantly, he did not argue against democracy as a solution to the current crisis of his time, rather he refers to the [good] "earlier democracy, which was instituted by Solon and re-established by Cleisthenes."

[24, 143]. According to what have been hitherto mentioned, we can see the link between his ideas of a good city with the one that those early famous rulers tried to establish as justified democratic state.

The date that the word "democracy" was invented in the history of mankind, is relatively unimportant, but the forms of democracy should be an important matter to understand its meaning, its process and its goals. These are the three aspect of a state legitimacy: input, throughput, and output legitimacy. There is no issue "where?", because, of course, it happened in the *Polis* of the Athenians. What is important, though, is that, the democracy in Ancient-Greek-style was extremely different from ours, in structure, its process and its *telos*. More important is that, when we are speaking about that moment, that the democracy we referred to, was a newfangled democracy which emerged from some styles of so called "ruled by some", which I would call it 'the pre-Socrates Aristocracy'. The nobility, myth, divine law of oracle and the imaginary glories of the Homeric poems were losing its authority [42, pp. 104-25], cf. [36, p. 13]. The sophistical reforms of the first and second generation led this age to two different direction of establishing a democratic state, two different form of democracy. One was carrying the demagogy element under the democracy's name, the other was carrying the right to the public deliberation for *all,* and insistence on possibilities on rethinking on laws under the two condition of rights to freedom of speech and public education, the concept of organic law or living constitution. These are the radical idea of that time that has been taken for granted today. It is based on such historical process, which led to what we have today as Representative Democracy.

However, Isocrates was critically concerned about the movement that led them to the right democracy. That democratic idea must go back to the representative democracy or in some point to the Aristocracy, but in an *esoteric* form. One might ask: why in esoteric form? Because of the intolerance of the ordinary people that would cause the revolution, instability and anarchy in the political community. We learn from them that the capacity of a society hinged upon the education, so as its democratic characteristics. A blink at the Middle East countries, one may wonder how come the democratic process is so low? May what we have presented here would be one of the main answer to such question. Another reason that approves our claim is related to the existence of tones of Isocrates' opponents. At least, it has been clear from the appearance of the words that he has been talking about the democracy, using this term as same as other political thinkers at his time, but it can be seen also that he portrayed himself as existing within and contending with huge critical voices. He actually receives attacks upon himself, his profession and his proposed *Polis*, but Why?

When we try to illustrate the situation with a simple example, we can imagine that there is a boat which heads to island X. Perhaps somebody among the passengers shouts out that we should go to the island X, then he faces lots of opponents against him. If the boat is going to island X, the reason of the opponents' voices can be several:
1) The boat does not go to island X.
2) The opponents are not aware that the boat goes to island X.
3) The island X has another meaning – here is another place- than what the others think.

In a fever of democratic society among each one of the population of the Athenian, was not that strange and anomalistic to talk about the democracy. That elucidates us how Isocrates meant something else, even though he used the term of democracy several times. His democracy was different with the ancient Greek democracy, just as the difference element that can be found between the Ancient and modern democracy. On the other hand, the critics which were on him indicate the separation of him from his

contemporary thinkers. Although, Isocrates had done all and he regarded his effort as a remedy for a situation so momentous, i.e. the present situation of Athens; and he hoped that his work would be an inspiration for the future, but not at any rate remains as just "oracle for the future" [26, 171].

11. Modern rhetorical approach

In the modern stand out political theories, there are two major approaches to the ancient Greek rhetorical tradition. One is an ideological critic, which is mostly applied by the temporal judgments of exegetical methods and the other is the human agency in the *Polis*, which is more relied on the analytical approach. It is important to note that the ideological critic must not be applied by the judgment about the past through the valuation of the present. Most of these failures come from the dark sides of the racism, elitism and sexism that happened in the historical through extreme movements and leads scholars that Greek rhetorical tradition had nothing in essence to present to us for our modern society. In fact, there are two movements in our modern political philosophy against this failure.

One of the movement is the way to recast the rhetorical endeavors, as Isocrates tried to, to present them as they are not for flattering the audience [11, 463ᵃ] or they are not to teach them how to gain domination in conflicts, but to recast them as the way to educate the citizens the art of citizenry by giving them the ability to deliberate and participate in the political realm. Gradual challenging sprite of each argument, if it based on the right principles, is based on the intellectual tradition of the sophists/philosophers. This method, which revived as the consequence of the ancient Greek philosophical-rhetorical tradition has been moved the modern political societies to the more solid nation-states [43], cf. [41, p. 92]. Since, such ability coupled with the right education that cause the awareness level of the participants improve several established discursive practice and consequently, improve outcome of such discourses, which helps the political community in its virtues, justice and liberty foundation.

The other movement is to show that how the rhetorical endeavors are important to the civic education when these endeavors combined with the political, philosophical context. The civic education lead *Polis,* or the modern nation-states, to be more harmonized and make citizens obey the just law by the art of self-consciousness, political consciousness, and historical consciousness. This democratic commitment to the state is the consequence of the rhetorical-philosophical education, elaborated by the modern concept of society and its components. This character can be found in modern works like S. Jarratt's *Rereading the Sophists* (Carbondale, Ill: 1991), C. Glenn's Rhetoric Retold (Carbondale, Ill: 1997), J. Atwill's Rhetoric Reclaimed (Ithaca: 1998), J. Kastely's Rethinking the Rhetorical Tradition (New Haven: 1997), V. Vitanza's Writing Histories of Rhetoric (Carbondale, Ill: 1994), and Poulakos' *Rethinking the History of* Rhetoric (Boulder, CO: 1993) [41, p. 18].

However, how rhetorical practices in society can shape the intellectual ability in social activity and how education can shape the rhetoric principle for the sake of establishing and maintaining of what we call it today as the liberal and democratic state, was the cornerstone of Isocrates thoughts. This point is still in the center of attention for those who examine the rhetoric in relation to the civic education.

With a great survey on Isocrates ideas, maybe compare to the schools of great philosophers like Plato and Aristotle his school seems trivial at a glance, but in itself, it has been found wanting.

However, reading Isocrates cause us to encounter several difficulties. One of them is for the essence of the "speech", simply because most of his works are speeches, they are only partial expositions of a man's reason for a specific perspective of the world. However, they seem that they are incomplete in structure, as they are directed to one particular audience or particular situation of

that time and this is an important point because he did not attempt directly to address the general predicament for having the best *Polis* with noble citizens. We can see in Plato and Aristotle views that the whole can be reconstructed only from a view of the whole, but that whole is not supplied by a speech as speech, which simply related to a particular situation. Todays, hence, the democratic state shall focus more on the educational aspect of the philosophy rather than the rhetorical aspect, although one of the main manifesto of the liberalism i.e. freedom of the speech, can only nourished and empowered by the rhetorical skill.

The second difficulty is that, how closely any passage may be identified with the author's own opinion has been always a question and it requires a great endeavors from interpreters to find that out. It is not a sure thing to say, Socrates in the *Protagoras* can be identical with Plato's own views. Similarly, it is not justifiable to accept Isocrates statements in conventionalized speeches to the Athenian Assembly as his genuinely ideas. Moreover, the distinction between the works related to the first period of Isocrates' life and the works related to the second part is unavoidable to understand Isocrates real doctrine. As per the aforementioned reasons, it can be seen that his writings could not have that easily apprehensible character granted to those whose goals have a more immediate specificity and clarity. However, Isocrates can be a great resource in the practical aspect of the rhetoric skill and esoteric teaching of the representative democracy.

The third difficulty is that, despite of all predicaments to interpret rhetorical speeches as the own ideas of their writers; we can argue that Isocrates deeds and works was aimed, in some point, to make the citizens of the *Polis*, good citizens [27, 3-5], [25, 87]. Though, not the art of speaking, but a combination between education and rhetorical skill which are the cornerstone of Isocrates school can be considered as the main elements of his idea to the progress of political situation of his time. Regarding the similar impact of this combination on all political ages, highlighting the importance of it in the education system and among the politicians, when the concern is with the better political life of the welfare of the citizens in the liberal democratic states. If we use the rhetoric, as Isocrates emphasizes, as a reflective, aesthetic deliberation which manifests into the political discussion, we have to recast philosophy as the other wings of this flight in out liberal education to have a just modern democratic society that one of its main focus is humanistic education in relation to the civic virtue and civic activities.

In this way, we can see Isocrates as one of the important figures in the history of western political philosophy. Hence, our focus on rhetorical aspects of political philosophy must not limited in fifth and fourth century. There are centuries of late Greek and Roman rhetorical-political theories that related to our modern political one and they are still must to be explored.

12. Conclusion

It has been elucidated that the culture of the political activity and its element is based on what the society is consists of: the people as socio-political component and the political principles of a power structure. Both of them under the rational-normative principle can be the foundations of the relationship between people and the state. In this respect, philosophical and rhetorical aspects of political education are one of the main causes of politicization and flourishing of democracy. This aspect in education seems crucial for the critical minds of citizens and the life of modern democratic states.

The correlated emphasis on this matter accrued in Isocrates works as the initial point of all critical thinking in politics and that was for the sake of improving the political regime. This progress has been always accompanied with emphasis on two aspects: the skill of leadership, and the skill of rhetoric. However, as Isocrates highlighted, 'leadership' is always hanging upon another skills such as being eloquence in language or having a *de facto* intellectual power. This is because man's nature is consisting of faculty of language. In this sense, the importance of language, or in the other word, the power of critical thinking, is knitted, on the one hand, to the nature of human being, i.e. intellectual being; and on the other hand, to its function, i.e. political active as a citizen. That is

how Isocrates recognized the difference between the word $\pi o\lambda\acute{\iota}\tau\varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\sigma\theta\upsilon\iota$ i.e. 'to live as a citizen', instead of the bare term 'to live'. Both of such concepts are pertaining to the concepts of political power: 'power over' and 'power to'.

Moreover, Isocrates' main objective, which emphasized on the philosophical methods in the practice of leadership in order to bring 'peace' to a political structure is conversantly correlates the doctrine of the toleration and wisdom in modern democratic state. This aspect is an assessment to the third concept of power as a combination of last two which emphasis on the autonomous will, 'power of'. However, I have argued that this aspect requires more political practice these days. Furthermore, in the realm of theoretic, the other movement is to show that how the rhetorical endeavors are important to the civic education when these endeavors combined with the philosophical context.

The democratic commitment to the state is the consequence of the rhetorical-philosophical tradition. This tradition elaborated by the modern concept of nation-state and its components in different aspects, such as how rhetorical practices in society can shape the intellectual ability in social activity and how education can shape the rhetoric principle for the sake of establishing and maintaining of, what we call it today as, the values of liberal and democratic states. It has been presented as the ground that how the Ancient theatrical theories of politics and practical practices of oratory [11, 659[a-c]] are adorned with the modern intellectual discussion, cultural practice, citizen intercourse and positive deliberation. Moreover, Along with this intellectual flourishing and progress, it has been illustrated that the rhetorical analysis *is* the critical thinking, and it is one of the main component in preservation of the notion of human beings, which is the under-going intrinsic values of each human societies.

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Notes:

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[i]   Prodicus of Ceos (*Πρόδικος*; c. 465 BC – c. 395 BC) was a Greek philosopher, and part of the first generation of Sophists. He came to Athens as ambassador from Ceos, and became known as a speaker and a teacher. Plato treats him with greater respect than the other sophists, and in several of the Platonic dialogues Socrates appears as the friend of Prodicus.

[ii]   A Greek philosopher of Ephesus (*Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος*; c. 535 – c. 475 BCE) was born near modern Kuşadası, Turkey, *but not Athenian*, who was active around 500 BCE;

[iii]   For instance, the domination of deontological virtue between 17th and 20th century.

[iv]   Pánton: genitive plural of the adjective "pas"(masculine), "pasa"(feminine), "pan" (neuter) meaning "all" / "whole"/ "every")= of all things

[v]   See also the discourse of panhellenism.

[vi]   Logographoi is a method of pre-Herodotian historians.

[vii]   German: *Fabelhaft, Sagenhaft*

[viii]   Isocrates was born in 436, Plato in 429.

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The Logic of Self-Organized Criticality

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Abstract:
A consideration of non-classical logic in terms of classical one allows us to show a role of designated truth values. In this way we show that our version of non-classical many-valued logic can be based on the structure of genetic code.
Keywords: many-valued logic, non-classical logic, designated truth values.

> We are suckers and will gravitate toward those
> variables that are unstable but that appear stable.
> *Talib N.* The Black Swan.

1. Principles of Universal Language

The Great Leibniz considered his main prime target to improve discovery art as such. For that he set up a problem to create the so-called universal characteristic. However, setting a problem and solving it are two absolutely different things. Ironically, in the article *New Method for Maximums and Minimums*… he focused on its implementation instead of considering the method in terms of metasymbols. I continue his work in the present paper and propose to use the signs of extremums as symbols of universal language.

Mathematics has the exact classification of extremums: maximums and minimums which are subdivided into smooth (derivative $y' = 0$) and sharp (derivative y' does not exist):

1.0. Maximums.
   1.1. Sharp maximums.
   1.2. Smooth maximums.
2.0. Minimums.
   2.1. Sharp minimums.
   2.2. Smooth minimums.

	Smooth	*Sharp*
Maximum	∩	∧
Minimum	∪	∨

Extremums are symbols of universal language. Complementary pairs fit each other as parts and

used also for letters of a genetic code [4]. Maximums ∩, ∧ are used to be designated by the letters **n** and **A**, and minimums ∪, ∨ by the letters **u** and **V**.

All two-letter words are formed by application of "*letters*" to themselves, providing a quantum leap to the highest level. Elements of microlevel take the meaning only in a macrolevel context. In pairs (*x*, *y*) a prefix *x* = MICROLEVEL (name), and a radical *y* = MACROLEVEL (surname). These elements of microlevel *form* macrolevel **BLOCKS**. Capital letters of radical dominants have a priority, and small letters of non-dominant radicals provide the priority to any letters of prefixes. The *designation* is provided by vowels and anti-designation by consonants.

Thomas Kuhn in his book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* emphasized as follows: "A decision between alternate ways of practicing science is called for, and in the circumstances that decision must be based less on past achievement than on future promise". He focused attention on the "normal" science (with a constant paradigm) that has not allowed it to describe a structure of scientific revolutions (with change of paradigms). Only after considering the logic structure of dominants and not dominants, it is possible to formulate structural principles of scientific revolutions.

The complete character of DOMINANTS is provided by submission to capital vowel or concordant of the radical and the vague character of non-dominants (with small letters of the radical) by the change of submission to vowel and concordant of the prefix. The mechanism of revolution and paradigm change can be learnt in this way. *A small change in transitional demiblocks prepares the great change between blocks.* The majority does not perceive a small change that generates errors of the 1st and 2nd kind. In hindsight, errors are perceived as prediction and afteraction phantoms respectively.

The *living logic* with the Matrix of Genesis allows defining the features matching the *plan of the Nature*. Creation of a block matrix (by means of the left tensor square) allowed revealing macrolevel and circular arrangement of charts. The genetic code is an information code. And in science philosophy there is no other way to follow the Nature except to follow genetic codes.

For a sample of letters of universal language, the author took letters of extremum signs. As a prototype for a symbol of a maximum there was the letter **A** (adenine), and the letter **u** (uracil) was the symbol of weak minimum. For another complementary pair, the similar turned signs were taken: a letter **V** (cytosin) as a minimum sign, and a letter **n** (guanine) as a sign of a weak maximum. The initial matrix is made up of the complementary pairs of consonants (**n**, **V**) and vowels (**A**, **u**). Accordants provide *stability* of the concaved (*caved in under the power*) consonants ***V,** and discordants provide *variability* of convex vowels (*arising dissidents*) ***A**.

The consideration of non-classical logic in terms of classical logic allows us to show clearly the reduction role for obtaining the designated truth values. The logic reduction of non-classical multi-valuedness to classical binarity of the designated and anti-designated truth values forms overlaps from right to left and from left to right, forming a hysteresis loop arranging the circular order.

The model offered allows tracking visually the large-block construction of the logic matrix, and then the arrangement of separate cells which are filled according to the principle of similarity. A position record needs only 4 letters at the highest levels. The positioning principle is inherent for analytic approach and for humanities it offers not less advantages, than for arithmetics.

The asymptotic correspondence of classical and non-classical theories is a manifestation of *the principle of compliance* which establishes the connection between these representations. The complementarity of levels generates fractality (self-similarity) of the main table structure. The offered genetic method to solve the problem of transition from one paradigm to another is the *message* which provides the clue to cognitive process that will help fill the gap between natural intelligence and artificial intelligence.

2. The Logic of Self-organized Criticality: *Designation and Anti-designation*

Elements form the four symbols of metascience as maximums and minimums:

$\wedge$ - a maximum, A, Adenin of genetic code and psychological type Art are designated as A = 11; it is a designated value;

$\vee$ - minimum, C, Cytosine and psychological type Authority are designated as the reversed sign V = 00; it is an anti-designated value;

$\cap$ - weak maximum, g, the Guanine and psychological type Media are designated as the sign n = 01; it is an anti-designated value;

$\cup$ - weak minimum, Uracyl and psychological type Scientist are designated as the sign u = 10; it is a designated value.

The alphabet of educational metasymbols solves a problem of polystructural integration of knowledge naturally through their comparison. The transition to the left tensor square allowed condensing *constellation* into a monolithic block [3]. The genetic table has 4 blocks of the designated and anti-designated pairs of metasymbols which are based on the universal language:

nn	**An**	**n A**	**AA**
Vn	**un**	**VA**	**uA**
nV	AV	nu	**Au**
VV	uV	Vu	**Uu**

z =

01 01	11 01	01 11	11 11
00 01	10 01	00 11	10 11
01 00	11 00	01 10	11 10
00 00	10 00	00 10	10 10

s =

2	3	3	4
1	2	2	3
1	2	2	3
0	1	1	2

Everything is predetermined by dominants. Sequences are estimated through consequences:

if it is consistent, then it is dominant – the basis is considered,

if it is inconsistent, then it is non-dominant – the beginning is considered.

The macrolevel dominants have the priority (for not dominants - any letters of microlevel do) [3], [4]. For dominant values there is a reduction in roots: A = 11, 0011 designated and V = 00, 11 00 the anti-designated values; for non-dominant values there is a reduction in the first figure: u = 10, 1010, 1001 designated and n = 01, 0110, 0101 anti-designated values [2].

Instead of considering true values (z) usually only the total number of units (s) is counted. So, we have incomplete information, without order. When s is more than 2 we receive designated values z, and when s is less than 2 we have anti-designated values z. Transitional value s = 2 is not decisive, because it is split into designated/anti-designated values (sat./unsat.). The transition from anti-designated 1100 to the next designated value 1001 is "awakening" like shift of subthreshhold values to the overthreshhold values. Vice versa the transition from the designated value 0011 to the anti-designated next value 0110 is "lulling". So, we have overthreshold values above and subthreshold values below. Between them thre is a critical zone that is characterized by ability to switch, turn quickly, as avalanche. None was familiar aith its delicate theory.

Thus, the classification of the designated and anti-designated pairs for the first time was received through genetics. Metasymbols generated new result in logic [4]. The probability theory usually uses the famous Pascal's triangle (at the left), that generates after splitting (in the center) a genetic triangle (on the right) by doubling numbers to the right of a vertical.

```
1|1                          1|1                          1|2
1 2 1                        1 1|1 1                       1 1|2 2
1 3|3 1                      1 3|3 1                       1 3 |6 2
1 4 6 4                      1 4 3|3 4 1                    1 4 3 |6 8 2
```

Let us count the total number of "fours" of logic codons: 8 indivisible left + 8 × 2 doubled right equal to 24 codons. In real genetics it provides 20 amino acids + STOP command. The total is 21 (minus 3 repeated ones). We have non-Pascal's asymmetric genetic triangle. When s = 2 the value is split into designated (the quantity doubles) and the antidesignated values. That is represented in asymmetric genetic triangle, but is not represented in a symmetric Pascal's triangle.

The classical model of probability theory fails because of inability to estimate financial risks. It is necessary to refuse from classical model in favor of fractal accident – spreading from a two-level kernel. In a dyad (bases and beginnings) everything is defined by dominants which are the highest teleologic principle of designation and anti-designation. Genetic approach allows finding logic structure on genetic principles – fundamental principles which are applied by the Nature. Rapprochement of economy and genetics unifies the science, explaining all macroscopical phenomena during the periods of crises.

Dealing with animated objects, we use Pascal's dead triangle as an artificial limb instead of live hand. After amputating the living unknown, we are unable to manage the risk. "Our aversion to variability and desire for order, and our acting on those feelings, has had precipitate severe crises... Since Plato the western thought and gnoseology focused on True/False concepts. Although it was good long ago it is time to switch to Stable/Unstable" [5]. N. Taleb applied for rare but world-shaking crises term "Black swan". It is Taleb's Fourth Quadrant, a block of *convex vowels*. It allows to represent variability ***A** as a cluster equal to a cluster of stability ***V** as *concaved* consonants. Diagonal oppositions of the designated and anti-designated true-false pairs anti-commutate in identity on designation: AV = –VA, causing a complementarity. An *anicommutativity* generates a qualitative transition, the small change in transitional blocks prepares a big change between blocks of dominants. The roots of complementarity are in a stability and variability problem. The principle of compliance generates fractality (self-similarity) for the structure of the main table.

Life wins due to expanded reproduction of the most adapted accidental mutations. Other disappears from a genetic bank [6]. The mutability is carried out through equiprobable options in genetic code, while the stability - through the absence of alternatives, when various options imploded. Doubling provides the raised stability during transfer of genetic information. There is an asymmetry of two clusters – designated cluster has twice more possibilities than antidesignated cluster.

Considering non-classical logic in terms of classical one allows us to show a role of designated truth values. The model of phase transitions which is a dream of P. Bak is based on the non-classical many-valued logic based on fractal structure of genetic code and isomorphism of self-organized critical theories [1].

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The Swarm Computing Approach to Business Intelligence

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Abstract:
We have proposed to use some features of swarm behaviours in modelling business processes. Due to these features we deal with a propagation of business processes in all accessible directions. This propagation is involved into our formalization instead of communicating sequential processes. As a result, we have constructed a business process diagram language based on the swarm behavior and an extension of that language in the form of reflexive management language.
Keywords: swarm intelligence, emergency, unconventional computing

1. Introduction

For designing the information systems of organisations the process algebras have been usually used to model networks of autonomous units communicating asynchronously via messages. These systems are

constructed as the service-oriented architecture. There are three types of business architectures: (i) static information systems where there are no structure changes during the system's runtime; (ii) dynamic information systems where there exist rules of system evolution; (iii) mobile information systems, where some components can change their context in the system's logical structure during its execution.

The formal language that is used for describing patterns of interaction in concurrent systems is represented by one of the forms of formalizations of *communicating sequential processes*. The first language of communicating sequential processes was introduced by Charles Hoare in 1978. These languages contain the items of two sorts: (i) communication events; (ii) processes which interact among themselves through message-passing communication. In these languages business processes can be coded algorithmically to simulate a real hierarchically composed business process ordered by some business rules leading to a business aim.

So, standardly, business processes are simulated by means of communicating sequential processes, i.e., in the form of sequences which can be defined algorithmically. There are many notations for representing real business processes within process algebras in communicating sequential forms: Business Process Modelling Notation, Business Process Execution Language for Web Services, Business Process Definition Metamodel, Event Driven Process Chain, Petri Nets, etc. [1], [4], [5], [6], [8], [10, [11], [13], [18]. These notations propose a business process diagram as an input transformation which is controlled by an interface. It is very useful to have a representation of real processes as a diagram where all entities are ordered algorithmically. However, in real organizations the requirements to define all tasks for the office staff as process algebra algorithms can complicate a real business process and overload the staff. Each staff member cannot be considered just automaton with some inputs and outputs.

In this paper, we propose how we can avoid sequentiality in modelling business processes. The matter is that communicating sequential processes reduce human resources to a kind of automata with inputs and outputs. But people can be tired or frustrated and sometimes it is better to have possibilities to define some tasks by the staff contextually. The contextuality of some tasks cannot be defined in the form of communicating sequential processes, because due to the contextuality we deal with an infinite set of atomic acts [14] and thus we cannot formalize business processes in the standard tools.

There is a kind of unconventional computing that is called *swarm computing* where we deal with processes which cannot be represented in the form of sequences. The point is that in swarms emergent effects appear usually, when the whole system cannot be considered an inductive composition of its subsystems. Hence, we can regard business organizations as swarms also, where there are some emergent effects, as well. In particular, due to these effects an organization can be more adaptive, when some roles are spontaneously redistributed in new changing contexts.

One of the swarms we have studied logically [2] is represented by the large one-cell organism of plasmodium of *Physarum polycephalum*. The plasmodium moves by protoplasmic streaming which reverses every 30-60s. It can switch its direction or even multiplies according to different biosignals attracting or repelling its behaviour. So, on the one hand, the plasmodium is a one-cell organism, but, on the other hand, it behaves as a swarm with splitting and multiplications.

Plasmodium motions can be controled by several instructions like: add node, remove node, add edge, remove edge [15], [16]. Adding and removing nodes can be implemented through activation and deactivation of attractants, respectively. Adding and removing edges can be implemented by means of repellents so that an activated repellent avoids a plasmodium transition between attractants. Hence, the plasmodium can be considered a programmable biological device in the form of a timed transition system, where attractants and repellents determine the set of all plasmodium transitions. As a result, in the case of plasmodium of *Physarum polycephalum*, we deal with a kind of process algebra. Its main

feature is that the plasmodium demonstrates a massive-parallel expansion in all possible directions. This feature is an emergent effect in plasmodium motions and cannot be represented in the linear form as sequences.

In *Physarum Chip Project: Growing Computers from Slime Mould* (PhyChip) [3] funded by the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), we have constructed a biological computer on programmable behavior of *Physarum* plasmodium. We have designed a software tool for simulating the plasmodium motions. This tool, i.e., a programming language used for the plasmodium computer, can be used also for simulating business processes. In this simulation we can examine business organizations as swarms with a kind of emergency. In this paper we show how we can code communicating business processes in our language.

2. *Physarum* Business Process Diagram Language

A business process is a set of activities performed in an organization to realize a business goal. A business process language is designed to model the business processes. This language can be used to support the design, administration, and configuration of business processes. Our language for simulating the plasmodium behavior [12] can be reestablished as a business process diagram language. Let us call it the *Physarum business process diagram language* that will be used as a graphical notation for business process modeling, with an emphasis on swarm effects. In this language we well deal also with AND-split, AND-join, OR-split, OR-join, etc., but with a possible emergency in configurations.

Using the Java environment, we have constructed the software tool working under the client-server paradigm. Communication between clients and the server is realized through text messages. An example of code responsible for the creation of new events associated with stimuli for the plasmodium has the following form:

```
p1_a1=new Attractant(195,224,1);
p1_a2=new Attractant(541,310,1);
p1_a1=new Attractant(580,92,2);
p2_r1=new Repellent(452,130,2);
p2_r1=new Repellent(659,327,1);
```

The two first parameters of events constructors determine the location whereas the last parameter is the client ID. The initial client window for fixing different events is shown in Figure 1. Then in accordance with properties of events the server proposes the sequence flows with their possible splitting or fusion, see Figure 2. The sequence flows correspond to veins of plasmodia between active points (attractants).

**Figure 1**: The *Physarum* client window for fixing events

Figure 2: The *Physarum* client window with three sequence flows and one splitting

In this graphical notations, we use events and arcs among events. Formally, this means that we have a transition system $TS = (E, L, T, I_{in}, I_{end})$, where:

- E is the non-empty set of events,
- L is the set of labels for transitions,
- $T \subseteq E \times L \times E$ is the transition relation,
- $I_{in} \subseteq E$ is the set of initial events.
- $I_{end} \subseteq E$ is the set of final events.

This transition system $TS = (E, L, T, I_{in}, I_{end})$ is presented in our software tool as a labelled graph with nodes corresponding to events from E, edges representing the transition relation T, and labels of edges corresponding to members from L.

In the business process simulation, an event from E can be (i) a start event from I_{in} (to start a process), (ii) an end event from I_{end} (to finish a process), (iii) an intermediate message or timer event from $E \setminus (I_{in} \cup I_{end})$. A label from L is a business task interpreted as an atomic activity that has to be performed within a process. In the *Physarum* business process diagram language we can define several task types like that: service, receive, send, user, script, manual, and reference. A transition from T is understood as a gateway, i.e., a routing construct used to control the divergence and convergence of sequence flow.

A topological structure of the plasmodium motions can be described as a triple $PM = (P, A, R)$, where

- $P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_k\}$ is a set of original points of plasmodia of *Physarum polycephalum*,
- $A = \{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_m\}$ is a set of attractants,
- $R = \{r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_n\}$ is a set of repellents.

A behavior of plasmodia is described by the set $V = \{v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_r\}$ of protoplasmic veins formed among attractants as well as from original points of plasmodia to attractants.

The business processes of $TS = (E, L, T, I_{in}, I_{end})$ can be reformulated in the form of plasmodium transitions due to the following set of bijective functions:

- $\sigma : P \cup A \to E$ assigning an event to each original point of plasmodium as well as to each attractant,
- $\tau : V \to T$ assigning a transition to each protoplasmic vein,
- $\iota_{in} : P \to I_{in}$ assigning an initial event to each original point of plasmodium.
- $\iota_{end} : S \to I_{end}$ assigning an end event to each final point of plasmodium from $S \subseteq E$.

In $TS = (E, L, T, I_{in}, I_{end})$, there are different compositions of transitions from T that are called *gateways*:

- *parallel fork gateways* for creating concurrent sequence flows which have different end events;
- *parallel join gateways* AND for synchronizing all concurrent sequence flows: at the beginning they have a splitting of one sequence flow A into several flows $A_1, \ldots, A_n$, then a fusion AND($A_1, \ldots, A_n$) = B;
- *parallel join gateways* OR for synchronizing some concurrent sequence flows: at the beginning they have a splitting of one sequence flow A into several flows $A_1, \ldots, A_n$, then a fusion OR($A_1, \ldots, A_n$) = B;
- *event-based decision gateways* XOR: at the beginning we choose one alternative of a set of mutually exclusive sequence flows $A_1, \ldots, A_n$, then we join alternative sequence flows into one sequence flow XOR($A_1, \ldots, A_n$) = B.

Hence, a workflow net is based on the following items:

- the initial events of I_{in};
- the final events of I_{end};
- the set of tasks $Ts = E \setminus (I_{in} \cup I_{end})$;
- the flow relation $F \subseteq (I_{in} \times Ts) \cup (Ts \times I_{end}) \cup (Ts \times Ts)$ such that every node is on a directed path from $i \in I_{in}$ to $i \in I_{end}$;
- the splitting AND, OR, or XOR;
- the joining AND, OR, or XOR;
- the removing defines the subnet of the whole workflow that is cleansed when the task is executed;
- the definition of instances number of each task in accordance with functions MIN (the minimum number of instances of task $t \in Ts$), MAX (the maximum number of instances of $t \in Ts$), threshold (if the threshold is reached, then all active instances are cancelled and the task is considered completed).

Thus, in this classical definition of workflow nets we assume that we always can build up a workflow net, where every event and every transition is located on a path from the initial event to the

final event. So, the initial event $i \in I_{in}$ has no incoming edges and the final event $i \in I_{end}$ has no outgoing edges. After the splitting AND, OR, or XOR we can construct an appropriate fusion AND, OR, or XOR. Therefore we deal with a directed graph from $i \in I_{in}$ to $i \in I_{end}$.

However, in case of swarms like the plasmodium of *Physarum polycephalum* we face the situation that there are no directed graphs, because any swarm has a strategy to be expended in all accessible directions and, thus, to prefer the splitting instead of the fusion. In other words, we ever face more outputs $i \in I_{end}$ than inputs $i \in I_{in}$.

Another problem is that any swarm has free will and under the same conditions swarms can behave differently.

In our *Physarum* business process diagram language, we have implemented some features of swarms including their expansion strategies. As a result, we avoid atomic actions because of impossibility to construct a workflow net inductively on the basis of atomic tasks.

3. Reflexive Management Based on Swarm Behaviour

The *reflexive management* is used for controlling a knowledge structure of agents in a way such that all performations satisfy the centre's goals, i.e., they are maximally favourable for this centre.

The substantional kinds of reflexive management are as follows:
- institutional management (modification of admissible sets of actions of all groups of agents);
- motivational management (modification of goal functions of concrete agents);
- informational management (modification of information which agents use in decision making). Informational management is devided into the following kinds:
- informational regulating (purposeful influence on information about states of affairs);
- expert management (purposeful influence on information about models of decision making);
- active prognosis (purposeful spread of information about future values of parameters depending on states of affairs and actions of actors).

In our *Physarum* business process diagram language, we can formulate reflexive games and reflexive management due to some swarm properties we have implemented in the business process model.

Let us start with defining some classes of transitions that will be used for defining reflexive games. For each event $e \in E$ in the transition system TS, we can determine its direct successors and predecessors in the form:

- $Post(e) = \bigcup_{l \in L} Post(e,l)$, where $Post(e,l) = \{e' \in E : (e,l,e') \in T\}$, is the *set of all direct successors of the event* $e \in E$;

- $Pre(e) = \bigcup_{l \in L} Pre(e,l)$, where $Pre(e,l) = \{e' \in E : (e',l,e) \in T\}$, the *set of all direct predecessors of the state* $e \in E$.

If there exists the event $e \in E$ in the transition system TS such that $card(Post(s)) > 1$, where *card* is the cardinality of the set, then TS is called a non-deterministic transition system. In non-deterministic transition systems, we deal with ambiguity of direct successors of some states, i.e., we have a splitting of events/tasks without their next fusion in accordance with AND, OR, XOR.

In non-deterministic transition systems, we can appeal to to rough approximation of sets defined in rough set theory (cf. [17]). Let $TS = (E, L, T, I_{in}, I_{end})$ be a transition system and $X \subseteq E$. The

lower predecessor anticipation $Pre_*(X)$ of X is given by

$$Pre_*(X) = \{e \in E : Post(e) \neq \varnothing \ and \ Post(e) \subseteq X\}. \tag{1}$$

The lower predecessor anticipation consists of all events/tasks from which TS surely goes to the events/tasks in X.

The *upper predecessor anticipation* $Pre^*(X)$ of X is given by

$$Pre^*(X) = \{e \in E : Post(e) \cap X \neq \varnothing\}. \tag{2}$$

The upper predecessor anticipation consists of all events/tasks from which TS possibly goes to the events/tasks in X. So, TS can also go to the events/tasks from outside X.

In terms of the rough sets approach, called the Variable Precision Rough Set Model, we can reformulate an inclusion relation. Let U be a given set of elements and $A, B \subseteq U$. The standard set inclusion is defined as

$$A \subseteq B \ if \ and \ only \ if \ \underset{u \in A}{\forall} u \in B. \tag{3}$$

Now, let U be a given set of elements, $A, B \subseteq U$, and $0 \leq \beta < 0.5$. The *majority set inclusion* is defined as

$$A \overset{\beta}{\subseteq} B \ if \ and \ only \ if \ 1 - \frac{card(A \cap B)}{card(A)} \leq \beta, \tag{4}$$

where *card* denotes the cardinality of the set. $A \overset{\beta}{\subseteq} B$ means that a specified majority of elements belonging to A belongs also to B. One can see that, if $\beta = 0$, then the majority set inclusion becomes a standard set inclusion.

By replacing the standard set inclusion with the majority set inclusion in the original definition of the lower predecessor anticipation of a set of states in a transition system, we obtain the following generalized notion of the β-lower predecessor anticipation. Let $TS = (E, L, T, I_{in}, I_{end})$ be a transition system and $X \subseteq E$. The β-*lower predecessor anticipation* $Pre_*^{\beta}(X)$ of X is given by

$$Pre_*^{\beta}(X) = \{e \in E : Post(e) \neq \varnothing \ and \ Post(e) \overset{\beta}{\subseteq} X\}. \tag{5}$$

The β-lower predecessor anticipation consists of each events/tasks from which TS goes, in most cases (i.e., in terms of the majority set inclusion) to the events/tasks in X.

Let $TS = (E, L, T, I_{in}, I_{end})$ be a transition system, $X \subseteq E$, and $0 \leq \beta < 0.5$. If $e \in Pre_*(X)$, then e is said to be a strict anticipator of events/tasks from X. If $e \in Pre_*^{\beta}(X)$, then e is said to be a quasi-anticipator of events/tasks from X. A set of all strict anticipators of X will be denoted by $\overline{Ant}(X)$ whereas a set of all quasi-anticipators of X will be denoted by $\overset{\approx}{Ant}(X)$. Notice that for any

X, $\overline{Ant}(X) \subseteq \overset{\approx}{Ant}(X)$.

Now we can extend a transition system $TS = (E, L, T, I_{in}, I_{end})$ of the *Physarum* business process diagram language to a *reflexive management language* $\mathsf{G} = (E, \mathsf{P}(E), Agt, Act, Mov, Tab, (^{\circ}_{A})_{A \in Agt_{1,2}})$, where

- E is a set of events/tasks of TS ;
- $\mathsf{P}(E)$ is a set of payoffs in reflexive games;
- Agt is a set of reflexive players (agents);

- Act is a non-empty set of strategies represented by $\overline{Ant}(X)$ or $\overset{\approx}{Ant}(X)$ for each payoff $X \subseteq E$, an element of Act^{Agt} is called a move;
- $Mov : \mathsf{P}(E) \times Act^{Agt} \to 2^{Act} \setminus \{\varnothing\}$ is a mapping indicating the available sets of actions to a given player in a given set of events/tasks;
- $Tab : \mathsf{P}(E) \times Act^{Agt} \to \mathsf{P}(E)$ is the transition table which associates, with a given set of events/tasks of the game and a given move of the players, the set of events/tasks of the game resulting from that move;
- for each $A \in Agt$, $^{\circ}_{A}$ is a preorder (reflexive and transitive relation) over subsets of E, called the *preference relation* of player A.

Thus, player's strategies $\overline{Ant}(X)$ or $\overset{\approx}{Ant}(X)$ are not exclusive, i.e., they can be intersected. The last one is the main feature of reflexive games and swarm behaviour. In these games we cannot define exclusive strategies at all. In reflexive games we can be engaged in an unlimited hierarchy of cognitive pictures: (i) each of the players can have their own picture about a state of affairs A, let us denote these pictures by $K_1 A$ and $K_2 A$; (ii) the first-order reflexion is expressed by means of pictures of the second order which are designated by $K_2 K_1 A$ and $K_1 K_2 A$, where $K_2 K_1 A$ are pictures of agent 2 about pictures of agent 1, and $K_1 K_2 A$ are pictures of agent 1 about pictures of agent 2, etc. In reflexive management we coose the level of reflexion n ($n > 0$) to coordinate actions of all players.

4. Conclusions

We have shown that communicating sequential processes formalized in standard business process diagram languages have ho emergent properties of swarms and if we try to implement these properties into business process diagram languages we face situations when splitting appears more often than fusion (section 1). After this implementation we can construct a reflexive management language (section 2) that contains some properties of swarms.

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The Unicity of Orthodox Spirituality

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Tudor Petcu: At the beginning of this dialogue, I would be very pleased if you could describe to us how you discovered Orthodoxy.

Rico Vitz: I'm Italian on my father's side, and like many Italian-Americans, I was born into a Roman Catholic family. Despite plenty of my own moral failings and a variety of intellectual misgivings about Roman Catholicism, I have always been drawn toward a devout life. So, when I was a young man, I seriously considered becoming a priest, a Capuchin Franciscan friar, more specifically. During that period of discernment, I met a beautiful woman who was considering becoming a Franciscan missionary. Through much prayer and discernment, we discovered that the vocation to which we were called was marriage, and in 1996, we were married. Almost a decade later, while we were awaiting the birth of our first child, we began to wonder whether we could, in good faith, raise him as a Roman Catholic, given our own growing sense of uneasiness about the faith and practices of Rome. Consequently, we began exploring Protestantism and attending a local Lutheran congregation.

Having been raised as a Roman Catholic, I had always thought of Orthodoxy as something like a corrupted version of Roman Catholicism, for Greeks and Russians. So, having become disillusioned with Rome and being neither Greek nor Russian, Orthodoxy did not really seem like something worth considering. Then something odd happened: one of my colleagues in graduate school converted from Protestantism to Orthodox Christianity. I found this rather puzzling, but it piqued my interest and caused me to consider Orthodoxy on its own merits. That, in short, is the back story of who we are and how we began to be drawn to the Church.

Tudor Petcu: What caused you to convert to Orthodox Christianity?

Rico Vitz: As we began to explore the faith – first in books, then in person – we were struck by the way that it had maintained a unified conception of truth, beauty, and goodness. This conception of the relationships among truth, beauty, and goodness was taken for granted in the ancient Greco-

Roman world but has largely been lost by contemporary people, at least in Europe and North America. Now, conversions are complex processes, so obviously we would not have described it in quite these words at the time, but that was in fact what we experienced: *Truth*. The most faithful expression of the faith once delivered to the saints. *Beauty*. A sacramental liturgical life of faith that recognizes the created world, especially the Divine Liturgy, as an iconic participation in the uncreated energies of God. *Goodness*. An ascetic way of life that provides the sacramental instruments for healing body and soul.

In short, we were overwhelmed by the rich experience of life in Christ as a unified conception of truth, beauty, and goodness. It was the experience of that life that lead us to be received into the Holy Orthodox Church on Lazurus Saturday in 2006.

Tudor Petcu: In your opinion, which Orthodox philosophers have managed to highlight the beauty of Orthodoxy in the most relevant ways?

Rico Vitz: There is something profound about the way you have phrased the question. In the western Academy, people do not think much about philosophy in relationship to *beauty* in the way that you are doing here. (At times now, they barely think of it in relation to *truth*!) Consequently, I have to think outside of my usual frame of reference to answer your question.

The people whose thought has best illumined the beauty of Orthodoxy for me are the neptic fathers, whose works are collected in the *Philokalia*, and Dostoevsky. In North America and in much of Europe, there is resistance to calling these figures 'philosophers'. To some extent this is understandable, but to an important extent it is rather myopic and parochial. There are genuine 'philosophers', in the traditional sense of the term (i.e., genuine 'lovers of wisdom'), who fall outside our contemporary frame of reference – e.g., Augustine and Aquinas in the West, Confucius and Xunzi in the Far East. The neptic fathers and Dostoevsky are examples of such lovers of wisdom, lovers of *Holy Wisdom*, from the Near East and from the Slavic lands.

Tudor Petcu: I would also like to ask you the following question, though I am not quite sure if this is the right way to phrase it. Do you think that it is correct to discuss any orthodox philosophy? I am asking this in light of the fact that many Orthodox confessors, for example those from Russia, were trying to demonstrate that Orthodoxy is not just a philosophy, but is something beyond philosophy, a spiritual wisdom focused on communion with Jesus Christ.

Rico Vitz: The short answer to your question is yes, I do think that it is correct to discuss Orthodox philosophy. So that your readers do not misunderstand my point, let me explain my answer in a bit more detail.

I disagree with the stances taken toward philosophy both by Tertullian and by Origen. Tertullian, on the one hand, claimed that 'Athens' (philosophy) should have little, if anything, to do with 'Jerusalem' (Christianity) and, thus, valued philosophy too lowly. Origen, on the other hand, tried too hard to get Christianity to conform to philosophy and, thus, valued philosophy too highly.

Each of these is a misapplication of the wise counsel St. Paul offers in his epistle to the Colossians, in which he advises us not to be taken captive by vain and deceptive philosophy in accordance with the traditions of men and not in accordance with Christ (Col 2:8). It is important to note two points in order to understand St. Paul's teaching. First, not every engagement with philosophy is an instance of being taken captive by philosophy. Second, not every form of philosophy is both in accordance with the principles of men and not in accordance with Christ. With these points in mind, we can rightly see that St. Paul's teaching is not a prohibition against philosophy *per se*. Rather, it is

a prohibition against being taken captive by a certain kind of philosophy, which is 'humanistic' in a way that is opposed to Christ.

In fact, in accordance with the sacred tradition, there are at least four ways that philosophy can be a benefit to Orthodox Christians. First, as St. Clement of Alexandria notes, philosophy can be a preparation for those who are being perfected in Christ. Second, as the lives both of St. Paul and of St. Justin Martyr suggest, philosophy can be a source for apologetic debates (see, e.g., Acts 17:18). Third, as both the theoretical work of the Cappadocian fathers and the practical work of the neptic tradition illustrate, philosophy can be a source of concepts and methods that can be appropriated in new ways to help explain the faith once delivered to the saints (Jude 1:3). Fourth, as the work of St. John Damascene illustrates, these same philosophical tools can be used for the purpose of evangelization.

So, should some forms of philosophizing be avoided? Yes, of course, as sacred scripture and sacred tradition suggest. Does it follow from this that Orthodox Christians should avoid *all* forms of philosophizing? No, of course not … also as sacred scripture and sacred tradition suggest.

Tudor Petcu: What could you say about the evolution of Orthodoxy in the US?

Rico Vitz: I have little to say about the more than two-hundred year history of the Orthodox Church in the North America. There are others who would be much more helpful in explaining those details.

I can, however, say a little bit about the more recent evolution of Orthodoxy in the United States. In the past few decades, there has been a significant increase in the number of us Americans, who have found our way home, to the Orthodox Christian Church. We have done so principally with the help of Antioch, via the Antiochian Archdiocese of North America, and of Moscow, via the Orthodox Church in America and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia. It is these jurisdictions that have probably been most responsive to the deep need for evangelizing the America people.

Tudor Petcu: How can Orthodoxy contribute to the American social identity from a spiritual or cultural point of view?

Rico Vitz: This is a difficult question. Given the times in which we live, it is rather difficult for me to tell exactly what Americans take their social identity to be. This will, of course, be an oversimplification, but essentially, the United States has historically been shaped by classical liberalism and by Protestantism. Now, however, Americans seem *en masse* to be questioning, if not outright abandoning, these political and religious traditions. Neither of our two major political parties seem deeply committed to classical liberalism, and Protestantism in the United States is in a radical state of upheaval.

I have no idea how things will unfold on either of these fronts. With respect to politics, I worry the United States will largely abandon classical liberalism for some less desirable alternative. With respect to religion, I suspect that much of Protestantism will continue to collapse and that Roman Catholicism will continue to look rather traditional on paper but remain rather syncretistic in practice. So, I suspect that if there is any long-term hope for traditional Christianity in the United States, it will be with the Orthodox Church.

Tudor Petcu: Do you think that there would be any chance in the future for Orthodoxy to become an important part of the American identity?

Rico Vitz: Yes, but only if we have strong and visionary leadership, especially among our hierarchs. In particular, this will require two things. First, Orthodox Christian jurisdictions in the United States must recognize and present themselves principally as Orthodox Christian, rather than as Greek, Russian, Antiochian, Romanian, and so forth. Thus, they must be faithful to their principal calling to provide a witness for the Gospel. Second, Orthodox Christians must address the intellectual sensibilities of the American people. It is true that the first priority of Orthodox Christians is to draw near to Christ by prayer and ascetic labors. If, however, the Orthodox Church truly wants to become an important part of the American identity, it must find a way of developing and presenting the richness of its intellectual life in such a way that it speaks to the hearts and minds of the American people, who are ignorant of many things that inform the Orthodox life – e.g., Church history, theology, philosophy, patristic psychology, and so forth.

Tudor Petcu: What does being an Orthodox Christian mean for you?

Rico Vitz: I am a sinner, greatly in need of God's mercy. In becoming an Orthodox Christian, I have been adopted into Christ's family, in which I continually encounter the majestic beauty of God's love and experience the sacramental richness of His saving grace. It is here, by God's design that I work out my salvation, supported by the love and prayers of my brothers and sisters in Christ, both those who are living and those who have fallen asleep in the Lord.

Tudor Petcu: How would you describe the relationship of Orthodox Christianity to other Christian spiritualties?

Rico Vitz: In *The Orthodox Church*, Kallistos Ware presents a parable by Alexis Khomiakov. It goes as follows:

> A master departed, leaving his teaching to his three disciples. The eldest faithfully repeated what his master had taught him, changing nothing. Of the other two, one added to the teaching, the other took away from it. At his return the master, without being angry at anyone, said to the two younger, "Thank your eldest brother; without him you would not have preserved the truth which I handed over to you." Then he said to the eldest brother, "Thank your younger brothers; without them you would not have understood the truth which I entrusted to you."

This nicely describes my own experience of the relationship of Orthodox Christianity to Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. The Orthodox Church has provided the most faithful witness to the faith once delivered to the saints. It is here that I have seen the True Light, here that I have received the Heavenly Spirit, and here that I have found the True Faith, worshiping the Undivided Trinity, one in essence and undivided. It was Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, however that helped to lead me here. And there are still many faithful Roman Catholics and Protestants whose lives provide me with encouragement and inspiration, as I strive to work out my salvation.

Does this mean that I believe that the Orthodox Christian Church, Roman Catholicism, and Protestantism are simply equal and interchangeable ways of trying to commit one's life to Christ? No, it does not. Do I hope that my Roman Catholic and Protestant family and friends will become Orthodox? Yes, I do, in God's time.

Tudor Petcu: Should we say that it is only in the Orthodox Church that people can gain redemption?

Rico Vitz: The Orthodox Christian Church is the spiritual hospital founded by Jesus Christ. Thus, it possesses the fullness of the means of grace by which God aims to save every person, body and

soul. Does that mean that the Holy Spirit is inactive outside the Orthodox Church? No, clearly not; otherwise, no one would convert to the faith. Does it mean that every person who dies without having been baptized into the Orthodox Church will be eternally separated from God? I don't know. God knows. Given all that I have studied and experienced, however, I seriously doubt that is the case.

Tudor Petcu: Given the subject of our dialogue, I think it would be very good if we would make reference to your philosophical work *Turning East* which is so important for a right understanding of Orthodox Christianity defined in its own history. What is the main purpose of this work?

Rico Vitz: In case some of your readers might not be familiar with the book, let me say a bit about both how it came together and what we hoped to accomplish.

I tend to be rather intrigued by people and their stories. After I converted to Orthodoxy, I began meeting other philosophers who had also converted. So, naturally, I would ask them how they came to Orthodoxy, and I found each of their answers fascinating. One day, I asked a couple of these Orthodox philosophers what they thought of the idea of a book, featuring a collection of these kinds of conversion stories. They loved the idea and encouraged me to put such a book together. That was the beginning of the project that became *Turning East: Contemporary Philosophers and the Ancient Christian Faith*.

In putting the text together, our purpose was twofold. First, we wanted to introduce Orthodox Christianity to Westerners who had at least a passing interest in philosophy. Second, we wanted to help encourage them to inquire into the faith. Judging from the responses we have received, the book seems to be doing well on both those points. But it also seems to be having a third effect, which we did not foresee – namely, drawing the interest of people in Orthodox countries and helping them to see their own faith in fresh ways. Because of this the book is now being translated into Greek and may be translated into Russian. I have also recently learned that a Romanian translation, *Întoarcerea spre Răsărit*, is supposed to be forthcoming this year from Renaşterea.